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TITLE

I

INTRODUCTION: THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

1.

DEFINITION

An economic
in

which there

is

and monetary union [hereinafter

EMU]

can be defined as an area

complete freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and

capital.

Additionally, the financial markets are completely integrated while the national currencies

are conventional and have irrevocable fixed exchange rates. In the end, the national

currencies
policy.

may be

replaced by a

common

1

The economic and monetary union
economic
1)

integration. Usually,

own

considered to be the highest form of

one gives the following hierarchy: 2

tariffs

Customs Union: In addition

common
3)

is

Free Trade Zone: Tariffs and quotas between the participants are abolished. However,

participants keep their
2)

currency and there will be one monetary

and quota vis-a-vis third countries.

to the conditions for

a Free Trade Zone, there

is

also a

tariff vis-a-vis third countries.

Common

Market: There

is

not only freedom of

movement of goods

(cf.

Customs

Union), but also freedom of movement of labor and capital.
4)

Economic Union: Aside from

the conditions for a

common

market, there

is

also an

harmonization of the economic policy.
5)

Economic and Monetary Union: Besides

the conditions for an

Economic Union

are also pegged exchange rates and a coordination of the monetary policy.

common

currency

is

introduced.

3

there

Possibly, a

2
2.

ANALYSIS
The

introduction of a monetary union

is,

of course, not a step which

without balancing carefully the possible advantages and disadvantages.
the following analysis:

2.1.
-

a

is

taken

One could

give

4

Advantages

common

currency has the advantages of

money

in general

(means of payment, unit

of account, store of value); as a result transaction costs are reduced and exchange risks
are diminished. Consequently, a
the growth potential in the
-

a

common

common

common

currency raises the allocative efficiency and

market.

currency makes speculative capital flows between the partner countries

impossible.
-

there

is less

need for international reserves because exchange reserves for transactions

between member countries are no longer necessary.
-

monetary integration can stimulate better coordination of the economic policy and
further

economic

integration.

economic policy, which
-

There will also be an external pressure on the

will give this policy

credibility.

monetary integration can give the zone more weight

2.2.

in international

monetary matters.

Disadvantages
a loss of independence in the field of monetary and exchange rate policy.

-

there

-

restrictions are

-

the

is

imposed on the national budgetary policy.

unemployment

rate

may

rise temporarily

enforced in order to defend the exchange
-

more

regional imbalances

may

get worse.

when a

rate.

deflationary policy must be

3
3.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This thesis examines two examples of a monetary union. The

on the blueprint for a European monetary union

(as laid out in the

first

part focuses

Treaty on European

Union); the second part analyzes the American example (the Federal Reserve System).

The

third

and

and argues

last part

discusses the similarities and differences between the two systems,

that although both

systems look very similar, there are important differences

which can be explained mainly by the lack of

political integration in

Europe.

TITLE

n

THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION

CHAPTER

1.

1

THE ROAD TOWARDS AN EMU IN EUROPE

HISTORY
The road towards an economic and monetary union

difficult one.

5

As

early as 1962, the

in

Europe has been a very

Commission submitted a proposal

that

would

realize

6

an economic and monetary union in three stages by 1971. The proposal was not acted

upon

1969 when a renewed interest from the part of the Commission resulted

until

so-called

memorandum

In the

same

Barre.

year, initiatives

resulted in the creation of the

report on 8 October 1970

8
.

were taken during the The Hague summit 7 which

Werner Committee. This Committee submitted

On 22 March

representatives of the governments of the

was very ambitious, 10 but
monetary problems

in the

its

final

1971 a resolution of the council and the

Member

States

was published9 The
.

resolution

the enthusiasm disappeared quickly because of international

(instability

of the dollar,

oil crises,

These turbulences blocked any further integration

lack of convergence in Europe).

at that

moment. From 18 December

1971, the calm was restored after an agreement was reached on

new exchange

rates with

wider margins (Smithsonian Agreement).

On
presented

22 March 1972, a new resolution on the economic and monetary union was

11

which reenforced the previous one of March 1971

basis of the so-called snake-mechanism).

The

international

strong for this system and the snake- mechanism
countries,

Denmark and Germany.

(this resolution

was

the

monetary events proved too

was very soon limited

to the

Benelux

5
In 1979, the

European Monetary System (EMS) was

satisfactory (although

however,

some concerns were

to

work

EMS

was,

up and seemed

raised at the beginning).

The

essence only a flexible exchange-rate agreement and everybody had started

in

to think that the plans for
this notion

set

an eventual economic and monetary union were buried when

reappeared in the Single European Act of 1986.

n The monetary union

pursuant to Article 102a only be achieved through a revision of the treaty.

measures relating

to coordination

possible, for example,

at

Other

of the national monetary and economic policy remained

on the basis of

During the Summit

13

could,

articles 103,

105 and 235.

Hanover on 17 and 18 June 1988,

the

European Council

decided to compose a committee that would study the realization of an economic and

monetary union (Delors Committee).

Economic and Monetary Union

14

in the

The

report of this

Committee (Report on

the

European Community), which was presented on

17 April 1989 at the Madrid Summit, brought the monetary integration again into the
spotlight.

The

report

was comprised of three chapters: the

first

was dedicated

to the

previous developments in the field of monetary integration; the second described the
ultimate stage in the realization of an economic and monetary union and the last chapter

addressed the stages on the road towards an economic and monetary union. The work of
the Delors

Committee provoked many

experts, but also

ECU

reactions, not only

from national governments. The

British

proposal", the idea of which was to create a

currency would be hard in the sense that

it

this thesis. It

new currency

in

Europe. This

to

Also the French and the Spanish

which we won't dedicate any attention

in

should be noted that the Delors report was a working document without any

legal consequences.

Treaty.

government presented her "hard

could never be devaluated vis-a-vis another

currency of the European Monetary System. 15

governments formulated counter proposals

on the part of monetary

The

practical realization of

it

would be achieved by way of a new

6
2.

THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT
In

the first

December 1990, two intergovernmental conferences were
was dedicated

to the

addressed the political union.

work, the conclusions were
of Maastricht].

The

17

treaty

new

basis of the

proposal, Europe
existing

The

to

Europe:

economic and monetary union, the other conference

On

9 and 10 December 1991, after almost one year of
Treaty on European Union [hereinafter Treaty

laid out in the

was signed formally on 7 February 1992.
provisions was a

was viewed

communities

16

initiated in

Luxembourg proposal of June 1991.

as a temple with three pillars: the first

which

In this

one consisted of the

new competencies would be added

(currency,

environment, education,...). In these areas decisions would be taken by majority vote.

The second

pillar is

and internal

affairs.

formed by foreign policy and
Within these

security,

pillars, decisions

and the third one by justice

can only be taken by unanimity.

This compromise became the basis of the Treaty of Maastricht which would

normally have entered into force on
treaty are the

18

January 1993.

1

Of

special importance in this

monetary provisions. Already during the Summit

June 1989, the decision had been taken

payment according

to the provisions

stage should begin on

1

July 1990.

to introduce a

in

Madrid on 26 and 27

common

(European) means of

of the Delors report.
19

defined on their content and timing.

It

was decided

In Maastricht, the different stages

The next

that the first

were

clearly

chapters discuss the different stages

consecutively according to their content and institutions. Afterwards,

we

will consider

the transition between the three stages.

CHAPTER

1.

2

THE CONTENT OF THE THREE EMU STAGES

THE FIRST STAGE
The

first

stage

was

initiated

on

1

July 1990.

2(

The

goal of this stage was the

achievement of a further convergence of the economic performances of the Treaty

7

members by means of a

better coordination of the

the existing institutional framework.

The

and the Treaty of Maastricht would be

EMU

the

1.1.

internal

market

ratified, in

in

Europe should be completed

order to allow a further realization of

in the following stages.

The Economic Aspects of the First Stage

1.1.1. After pointing to the basic principles of the

the

economic and monetary policy within

new

open-market economy (Article 102a),

regulations organize a coordination of the national

economic policy options

around broad guidelines. These guidelines will be formulated by the [ECO/FIN] Council

on a recommendation of the Commission. The European Council will discuss a
conclusion along these guidelines on the basis of which the [ECO/FIN] Council will

adopt a recommendation. The Council shall inform the European Parliament of

recommendation.

this

21

These provisions are complemented by a multilateral surveillance, the purpose of

which

is to

achieve better coordination of economic policy and a sustained convergence

of the economic performances of the
the basis of reports submitted
the

Member

States

and

in the

Member

by the Commission)

Community

with the broad guidelines referred

to.

The Council

necessary information to the Commission.
it

is

will

established that the

provided that the Council (on

monitor developments in each of

as well as the consistency of

assessment for the purpose of surveillance.

Where

States. It is

economic

policies

will regularly carry out an overall

The Member

States shall forward all

22

economic policies of a Member State are not

consistent with the broad guidelines mentioned above, or that they risk jeopardizing the

proper functioning of the economic and monetary union, the Council

may

(acting

on a

recommendation from the Commission), by a qualified majority, make the necessary
recommendations

to the

Member

State concerned.

By means of

the

same procedure,

the

8

may

Council

provided).

decide to

make

its

recommendations public

(this

is

the only sanction

23

The

Commission

President of the Council and the

shall report to the

European

Parliament on the results of the multilateral surveillance. In case the Council has made
its

recommendations public,

Committee of
It is

the

its

President

may be

invited to appear before the competent

European Parliament. 24

important to note that the arrangements mentioned above (concerning the

formulation of broad guidelines and the multilateral surveillance) are not limited to the
first stage.

They are permanent

rules in the construction of the

economic and monetary

union.

1.1.2. Article 103a. 1 provides that the Council, acting

the

unanimously on a proposal from

Commission, may decide upon the measures appropriate

to the

economic

particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products).

1.1.3.

During the

first stage,

the

Member

all restrictions

on the movement of capital and

between

Member

and between

1.1.4.

The Member

financing

27

states are also

25

States will adopt the appropriate measures to

remove

States

situation (in

Member

States

and

all restrictions

third countries.

on payments

26

expected to take measures which prohibit monetary

along with measures that abolish privileged access by any Government or

public undertaking to financial institutions. 28

1.1.5.

Economies and public finances

will

be harmonized;

in order to achieve this

multiannual programs will be submitted to the [ECO/FIN] Council. 29

9
1.1.6.

The economic

Council

policy of every

Member

State will be

carefully.

The

on the basis of a report from the Commission, assess the progress made

will,

with regard to the economic and monetary convergence.
price stability, public finances, and the progress

Community law concerning

1.2.

examined very

the internal market.

The examination

made with

will focus

on

the implementation of

30

The Monetary Aspects of the First Stage

1.2.1.

No

institutional provisions

are provided for the

stage to help achieve

first

31
The present discretion between the Central Banks (within the
monetary union.

Committee of Presidents of

1.2.2.

the

Yet, one should note Article 109g of the Treaty: "The currency composition of

ECU

basket shall not be changed."

possibility to

The importance of

this

provision

is clear:

every

change the composition of the basket will disappear as soon as the Treaty

of Maastricht

means

the Central Banks) will continue.

that the

is ratified.

This ratification became a fact on

ECU-basket

as defined in

1989

32

is

1

November

1993, which

the final and last composition of the

ECU.

2.

THE SECOND STAGE
The second

stage started

further coordination of

on

33

1

January 1994. This stage

is

characterized by a

economic and monetary policy. The economic part of

EMU

is

nearly completed in this stage while one also takes a decisive step on the road towards

monetary union.
responsibilities
States.

34

In spite of this, the different national authorities will keep their

for the conduct of

monetary policy within the respective

Member

10
2.1.

The Economic Aspects of the Second Stage

As

2.1.1.

stated above,

the provisions relating to free

Member

freedom of payments between

movements of

capital

spite

of

this,

Community

law.

35

and

Restrictions

to

on

States and third countries will

some exceptions have been provided

for

Member

Furthermore, certain restrictions remain possible which are applicable

to both transactions within

countries.

36

Member

The same goes

States as well as

stage, Articles

The

Central

109h and 109i of the

37

Member

Until the

EEC

between

Member

which apply only

for certain restrictions

of capital to and from third countries.

to

Member

capital

which on 31 December 1993 enjoy a derogation on the basis of existing

States

2.1.2.

States will take full effect.

and on payments between

be equally forbidden. In

movement of

Treaty remain relevant.

Banks of the

the Central

provide overdraft

different

Member

The

future

States will not

or any other type of credit facility in favor of

facilities

institutions or bodies, central

movement

to the

States proceed to the third

prohibition on monetary financing will take full effect.

Bank and

States and third

European

be allowed

Community

governments, regional, local or other public authorities,

other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of the

Member

States.

The

purchase of debt instruments directly from those entities by the European Central Bank
or the national central banks

2.1.3.

The

equally forbidden.

38

prohibition of privileged access of the government to the financial sector will

be implemented

2.1.4.

is

in the

second stage.

The Treaty of Maastricht

purpose of

this

is

to

make

commitments of Member

clear

39

also provides a declaration of non-liability.
that

the

Community

States and that a solvent

Member

shall

40

The

not be liable for the

State cannot

be called upon

11

other EC-countries ("no bail out"). This arrangement

to

cover the debts of one of the

is

without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific

1 1

project.

Member

2.1.5. During the second stage, the

government41
discipline

deficits.

42

The Commission

on the basis of two

criteria:

States will endeavor to avoid excessive

examine compliance with budgetary

will

43

-whether the ratio of the deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3 %

market prices

at

(unless the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that

comes close

to the reference

value or unless the excess over the reference value

is

only

exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value); and

-whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds 60
prices, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing

%

at

market

and approaching the reference value

at a satisfactory pace.

The Commission

will monitor the

stock of government debt in the

Member
two

the requirements under either of the

of an excessive deficit in a

Member

development of the budgetary situation and the
States. In case a

State does not fulfill

mentioned above (or

criteria

State), the

Member

Commission

if

there

will prepare a report.

report will also take into account whether the government deficit exceeds

investment expenditure and consider

all

is

other relevant factors, including the

a risk
44

government

medium-term

economic and budgetary position of the Member-State. 45 The Monetary Committee
formulate an opinion on this report

The Council

will (on a

observation the
deficit exists.

46
;

afterwards,

47
it

will

be submitted

recommendation of the Commission and

Member

State concerned wants to

The

will

to the Council.

after considering

any

make) decide whether an excessive

48

In case the Council decides that there

recommendations

to the

Member

is

an excessive

State concerned with a

view

deficit,

it

will

make

to bringing that situation

12
to

an end within a given period.

49

If the

Member

comply with these

State does not

50
recommendations, they can be made public. During the second stage,

severe sanction possible.

51

To

most

Member

State

the extent that the excessive deficit in the

has been corrected, the Council will abrogate
statement that an excessive deficit in the

2.2.

this is the

its

Member

may make

sanctions and

State concerned

no longer

a public

exists.

52

The Monetary Aspects of the Second Stage

2.2.1.

the second

Institutionally,

European Monetary

Institute

stage

characterized by the establishment of a

is

(EMI) which can be considered the precursor of the

European Central Bank. At the same time, the Committee of Governors [of the Central
Banks] will be dissolved.

53

The European Monetary

Institute

will

coordination and the preparation of stage three.
the

personality;
54

President

EMI

will

institutional aspects

an independent entity with legal

be directed and managed by a Council consisting of a

EMI

will

be discussed in a separate chapter dedicated

The exchange

be used

to

rate

mechanism of

the

European Monetary System

the second stage. Indeed,

one of the

will

is

which

decide whether the "high degree of sustainable convergence" necessary

related to this

the transition

become

criteria

for the transition to the third stage {see infra) has been achieved within the
is

to the

of the three EMU-stages.

more and more emphasized during
will

It is

policy

and the Governors of the national central banks. For reasons of clearness,

the functioning of the

2.2.2.

work mainly on monetary

mechanism. Article 109j

states that

Community

one of the conditions necessary for

"the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for

exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for
without devaluing against the currency of any other

Member

State.

at least

"

by

the

two years,

Provided that the

13

"Community exam" on

the conditions for transition to the third stage will be held at the

end of 1996, the beginning of the second stage

exchange

is

also necessarily be the beginning of the

rate discipline.

2.2.3. During the second stage, each

independence of

its

Member

State will start the process leading to the

central bank. "Article 108 asks that each

that its national legislation (including the statutes

of

its

Member

State will ensure

central bank) will

be compatible

with the Treaty of Maastricht and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
at the latest

3.

on the date of the establishment of the ESCB.

THE THIRD STAGE

3.1.

The Economic Aspects of the Third Stage

3.1.1.

A

procedure has been introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht which creates the

possibility of

Community

financial assistance for

Member

States

which

are,

due

to

exceptional occurrences, in difficulties or which are seriously threatened with severe
difficulties.

the

In such a case, the Council decides, acting

Commission, on the granting of

aid.

disasters, a qualified majority is sufficient.

Where

unanimously on a proposal from

the difficulties are caused

The President of

by natural

the Council will inform the

European Parliament of the decision taken. 56

3.1.2. In the third stage,
deficits.

57

Member

As opposed

Member

to the

States will

have

may

decide to notify the

measures for the necessary

avoid excessive government

second stage, certain sanctions are provided. In case a

State persists in failing to put into practice the

the Council

to

Member

recommendations of the Council,

State to take, within a specified time-limit,

deficit reduction. First, the

Council

may

request the

Member

14
State to submit reports in accordance with a
efforts

the

made by

Member

the State.

specific timetable in order to

In case the Council

State concerned,

it

may

is

examine the

not satisfied with the cooperation from

decide to apply measures ranging from the

requirement to publish additional information before issuing bonds and securities, or an
invitation to the

Member

European Investment Bank

State concerned to the requirement to

appropriate size with the
is

deemed necessary,

size.

58

to reconsider its lending policy

Community

the Council

make a

non-interest-bearing deposit of an

until the excessive deficit

may

towards the

also decide to

has been corrected. If

impose

fines of an appropriate

All decisions taken will be communicated to the European Parliament.

59

As

soon as the excessive deficit has been corrected, the decisions taken will be abrogated.

3.1.3.

The Council may, on a proposal from

ECB,

acting

the

Commission and

international levels as regards to issues of particular relevance to the

also (this unanimously) decide

3.2.

The Monetary Aspects of the Third Stage

The uniform monetary

its

60

after Consulting the

by a qualified majority decide on the position of the Community

may

it

EMU. The

at

Council

representation in these matters.

policy will be conducted within a

new

institutional

framework.
3.2.1.

The European Central Bank61

will

be established as the pivot of a European

System of Central Banks [hereinafter ESCB]. 62 The
central banks: the twelve banks of the

The

ECB

is

explicitly

attributed

legal

competencies and obligations of the

compose

the system.

65

Member

ESCB

States

personality

ESCB

64

is

a conglomerate of thirteen

and the new ECB. 63
while the

ESCB

is

not.

The

are those of the thirteen legal persons that

In case the internal competencies are not specified, the principle

of subsidiarity will be applied. 66 The

ECB

and the

ESCB

will

be examined in

the chapters dedicated to the institutional provisions of the three

detail in

EMU-stages. 67

15

The

3.2.2.

Committee.

68

also

stage

third

envisions

The importance of

this

the

Committee

Economic and Financial

of an

birth

will also

be discussed

in the part

on

the institutional provisions of the Maastricht Treaty.

At the

3.2.3.

starting date

Member

of the

States

Commission and

of the third Stage, the Council will, acting with the unanimity

without a derogation (see infra),

after consulting the

ECB, adopt

the conversion rate at

currencies will be irrevocably fixed and at which rate the
these currencies.

The Council

At

this point, the

will, acting

ECU

become

ECU

will

a currency in

which the EC-

be substituted for

its

own

right.

69

according to the same procedure, also take the other measures

necessary for the rapid introduction of the
States.

will

on a proposal from the

ECU as

the single currency in the

EC Member

70

Primarily, this

means

into circulation. Article

that notes

and coins denominated in

issued either by the

ECB

allowed to issue coins subject to approval by the

3

be brought

Community. The notes

They

or by the national central banks.

notes to have the status of legal tender within the

CHAPTER

will

105a provides that the European Central Bank will have the

exclusive right to authorize the issuance of banknotes within the

may be

ECU

Community.

ECB

will be the only

Member

on the volume of the

States are
issue.

71

THE INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN THE TREATY OF

MAASTRICHT

1.

THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
Article 109c.

will

1

provides for the establishment of a Monetary Committee which

promote coordination of the policies of the Member

States.

The

text

of the Treaty

suggests that this Committee will be created on the date of the ratification of the Treaty

of Maastricht. This

is

not the case: the Monetary Committee has been functioning since

16

1958
the

(cf.

new

Article 105 EEC-Treaty); but

its

mission

is

slightly redefined in the context

perspectives opened by the Treaty of Maastricht.

be dissolved

at the

beginning of the third stage.

The Monetary Committee

of

will

72

Composition

1.1.

The Member

States

and the Commission will each appoint two members

to the

73
Monetary Committee.

1.2. Tasks

The
-

to

tasks of the

Committee can be outlined

74

Member

keep under review the monetary and financial situation of the

Community, and

the

Committee

the general

payments system of the

will regularly report hereon to the

to deliver opinions to the

-

as follows:

Member

States.

States and of

The Monetary

Council and to the Commission;

Council and the Commission

(at their

request on or

its

own

initiative);

-

to contribute to certain duties

-

to

examine,

the

at least

of the Council;

once a year, the situation regarding the movement of capital and

freedom of payments, as they

result

from the application of the Treaty of Maastricht

and of measures adopted by the Council. The Committee will report
and

2.

to the

Council on the outcome of

this

to the

Commission

examination.

THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE

2.1. Structure

The European Monetary
stage.

75

The members of

the

Institute has legal personality

Institute

EMI
and

(EMI) was established

at the start

are the national banks of the
is

directed and

Member

of the second
States.

76

The

managed by a Council composed of a

17
President

and of the Governors of the national central banks.^The President

appointed by

Heads of

common

State or

accord of the governments of the
78

EMI

Government. As soon as the

Committee of Governors

[of the central banks of the

Member

States at the level of

had been

Member

is

States]

both the

up,

set

and the European

Monetary Cooperation Fund 79 were dissolved. 80

2.2. Tasks

The EMI has

to contribute to the creation

transition to the third stage of the

EMU.

of the conditions necessary for the

In order to achieve this

it

will:

81

-

strengthen cooperation between the national central banks;

-

monitor the functioning of the European Monetary System;

-

hold consultations concerning issues falling within the competence of the national
central banks

and affecting the

stability

of financial institutions and markets;

-

take over the tasks of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund;

-

facilitate the

the
-

ECU

use of the

ECU

and oversee

its

development, including the functioning of

clearing system;

hold regular consultations concerning the course of monetary policies and the use of

monetary policy instruments; and
-

normally be consulted by the national monetary authorities before they take decisions

on the course of monetary policy

in the context

of the

common framework

of ex ante

coordination.

For the preparation of the
-

third stage, the

EMI

will:

82

prepare the instruments and the procedures necessary for carrying out a single monetary
policy in the third stage;

-

promote the harmonization, where necessary, of the rules and practices governing the
collection, compilation

competence;

and distribution of

statistics in the

areas within

its field

of

18
-

prepare the rules for operation to be undertaken by the national central banks within the

framework of the ESCB;
-

promote the efficiency of cross-border payments;

-

supervise the technical preparation of

Before 31 December 1996 the
logistical

framework necessary

framework
its

for the

banknotes.

will specify the regulatory,

ESCB

be submitted for decision

shall

establishment.

2.3.

EMI

ECU

to

perform

to the

at the date

of

83

Means

on both the Community and the International

2.3.1.

On

the

members of
-

tasks in the third stage. This

European Central Bank

In the light of the tasks mentioned above, the
act

its

organizational and

Community
Council:

its

level, the

EMI

European Monetary

Institute

can

level.

may, acting by a majority of two-thirds of the

84

formulate opinions or recommendations on the overall orientation of monetary policy

and exchange-rate policy as well as on related measures introduced

in

each

Member

State;
-

submit opinions or recommendations to governments and to the Council on policies

which might

affect the internal or external

in particular, the functioning
-

make recommendations

monetary situation

in the

Community and

of the European Monetary System;

to the

monetary authorities of the

Member

States concerning

the conduct of their monetary policy

Furthermore,

the

EMI may

unanimously decide

to

publish

its

opinions

and

its

recommendations.

The EMI
States regarding

will

be consulted by the Council and the authorities of the

Member

any proposed Community Act or any draft legislative provision within

19
its

field

of competence. The European Monetary Institute

exchange reserves as an agent for and

at the

may

hold and manage foreign

request of national central banks. Profits and

from these operations are for the account of the national central bank

losses resulting

depositing the reserves.

The EMI

will

contracts in accordance with rules laid

perform

down

in

this function

on the basis of

a decision of the

bilateral

EMI. 85

2.3.2. In the international field, emphasis must be placed on the fact that the

EMI may

"grant to the monetary authorities of third countries and to international institutions the
status

ECU's may be

2.4.

ECU'S and

of 'other holders' of

fix the

terms and conditions under which such

acquired, held or used by other holders."

86

Independence

European Monetary

Article 8 of the Protocol on the Statute of the

emphasizes that the members of the Council of the
responsibilities."

The same

Member

States.

act "according to their

Council of the

article stresses

that the

Community

institutions

take any instructions from

EMI

and

EMI may

own

not seek or

bodies or governments of

Both the Community and the national authorities undertake

principle and not to seek to influence the Council of the

Institute

EMI

in the

to respect this

performance of

its

tasks.

3.

THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

3.1. Structure

The European
the

Central

Bank

[hereinafter

ECB]

executes

its

tasks via three organs:

Governing Council, the Executive Board, and the General Council.

20

The Executive Board

3.1.1.

The Executive Board of
President, and four other

Member

the

ECB

will

be composed of a President, a Vice-

will

be appointed from among nationals of

Members. 87 They

standing and professional experience in monetary or

States of recognized

banking matters. Their appointment will be made by
of the

Member

States

the

at

of Heads

level

recommendation from the Council

common

after

it

of State

guidelines and decisions laid

is

will

fixed at eight years, and

implement monetary policy

down by

a

is

not

have certain powers delegated

to

it

accordance with the

in

the Governing Council {see infra) and will give

the necessary instructions to the national central banks.

The Executive Board may

also

where the Governing Council so decides. 89

The Governing Council
The Governing Council of

Executive Board of the

ECB

the

ECB

be composed of the members of the

will

and the Governors of the national central banks. 90 The

tasks of this organ consist of adopting of the guidelines

and making of the decisions

necessary to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to the
[of Maastricht] and the statute [of the

Community and

will formulate the

establish the necessary guidelines for

The Governing Council
internal organization of the

ESCB

its

and

its

monetary policy of

implementation.

91

which determine the

will adopt "Rules of Procedure"

ECB

under the Treaty

European System of Central Banks and of the

European Central Bank]. The Governing Council
the

on

88

The Executive Board

3.1.2.

Government,

or

consulted the European Parliament and the

Governing Council of the ECB. The term of office
renewable.

accord of the governments

92

decision-making bodies. Each

member of

Governing Council will have one vote, except for certain decisions related
financial organization of the

majority. In the event of a

ECB. Normally,
tie,

the

to

the
the

Governing Council will act by a simple

the President has the casting vote.

93

21
3.1.3.

The General Council
The General Council

the Vice-President of the

members of

The

ECB

the Executive

allowed to vote.

is

a temporary

94

organ which consists of the President and

and the Governors of the national central banks. The other

Board may participate

meetings of the Council, but are not

in

95

tasks of the Council are listed in full

96

in Article

47 of the

Statute.

EMI

which

Member

States;

the responsibilities mentioned are the performance of certain tasks of the

must

still

be completed due

to the derogations (see infra)

contribution to advisory functions of the

ECB;

of one or more

Among

the taking of measures necessary for the

application of Article 29 [of the Protocol on the Statute of the

European System of

Central Banks and of the European Central Bank], namely the subscription of the

ECB's

capital, etc....

3.2. Tasks

3.2.1. General Responsibilities

The
those of the

which

tasks

and responsibilities of the European Central Bank are determined by

ESCB

states that in

means of

(see infra).

At

this point,

it

may be

order to carry out the tasks entrusted to the

ESCB,

the

ECB may

by

regulations:

-

define and implement the monetary policy of the

-

require credit institutions established in

accounts with the
-

sufficing to point at Article 108a

ECB

Member

Community;
States to hold

minimum

and national central banks;

ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the
with other countries;

reserves on

Community and

22
-

perform tasks conferred upon her by the Council under Article 105(6) concerning

and other financial

policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions
institutions with the exception
-

of insurance undertakings;

help implement the measures of the Council referred to in Article 106(6).

The

ECB may

also take decisions necessary for carrying out the tasks entrusted to the

deliver opinions. ^The

ESCB, make recommendations and
its

decisions,

recommendations and opinions. 98

ECB may

Within the limits and under the

conditions adopted by the Council under Article 106(6), the

impose

payments on undertakings

fines or periodic penalty

with obligations under

ECB

shall

be entitled

in case they don't

to

comply

regulations and decisions."

its

In order to be complete,
different occasions,

decide to publish

we must

point to the fact that the Treaty confers, on

advisory functions upon the

ECB;

responsibilities in the field of prudential supervision

the

ECB

is

also attributed

and the collection of

statistical

information. Both aspects will be explained briefly.

3.2.2. Advisory Functions

The European Central Bank
exchange-rate

competence.

101

policy

The

100

on

and

ECB

specified

106(6).

by the Council

any

will also

legislative provision in its field of

in

is

attributed an advisory function in the area of

proposed

Community

act

in

its

field

of

be consulted by national authorities on any draft

competence. The scope of the

latter

accordance with the procedure laid

provision will be

down

in

Article

102

3.2.3. Prudential Supervision and Statistical Information

One of

the tasks of the

policies pursued
credit institutions

ESCB

will

be

by the competent authorities
and the

stability

to contribute to the

smooth conduct of

relating to the prudential supervision of

of the financial system.

103

Article 25 of the Protocol

23

on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central

Bank makes

ECB may

clear that the

offer advice (spontaneously or

Council) to the Commission and the competent authorities of the

on the request of the

Member

States on the

scope and implementation of Community legislation relating to the prudential supervision
of credit institutions and to the

stability

of the financial system. Eventually, the

perform certain tasks concerning policies relating
institutions

and

undertakings.

The
statistical

financial

tasks

with

the

performed by the national central banks

information

may be

exception

of

of credit

insurance

in the field

of the collection of

continued. According to Article 5 of the Protocol on the

European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank

the responsibility of the

information the

ESCB

ECB

it

and the national central banks to collect the necessary

needs to perform her tasks.

contribute to the harmonization

3.3.

institutions,

to the prudential supervision

104

Statute of the
is

other

ECB may

105

Where

of the rules and practices in

necessary, the
this field.

ECB

will

106

Means
The

ECB

disposes of, on the one hand, a capital, and, on the other hand, foreign

reserve assets which have been transferred to her by the national central banks.

3.3.1. Capital

The

capital of the

European Central Bank

will consist of

ECU 5.000 million.

sole subscribers to and holders of this capital are the national central banks.

The

The key

for

subscription of this capital will be determined in function of the share of the respective

Member
the

States in the population of the

Community. 107

Community and

in the gross domestic product of

24
3.3.2. Transfer of Foreign Reserve Assets to the

The

ECB

ECB

be provided by the national central banks with external foreign

will

amount equivalent

reserve assets up to an

to

ECU

50.000 million. The Governing

Council will decide upon the proportion to be called up immediately after the
establishment of the

ECB

has the right to hold and

them for the purpose

and upon the amounts

manage

set

to

be called up

at later dates.

the foreign reserves that are transferred to

it

The
and

ECB

to use

out in the Statute [of the European System of Central Banks

108
and of the European Central Bank].

3.4.

Independence

The provisions which must assure

the independence of the organs responsible for

the monetary policy will be discussed in the following discussion

on the European System

of Central Banks.

4.

THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS

4.1. Structure

The ESCB
banks.

109

will

The System

will

be

composed of

the

ECB

and

of the

national

central

be governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB,

namely the Governing Council and the Executive Board. 110

4.2. Tasks

Article 105 states that the primary objective of the
stability.

Without prejudice

economic policies

in the

summed up

this

objective,

the

Community. The System

principle of an open market

frame, can be

to

economy. The

as follows:

111

ESCB

ESCB

is

will
to

be

to maintain price

support the general

will act in accordance with the

tasks conferred

upon the

ESCB

within this

25
-

in the first place, the

ESCB

is to

define and implement the monetary policy of the

Community;
System

will conduct foreign-exchange operations;

112

-

the

-

a third task consists of the holding and managing of the official foreign reserves of the

Member
-

States;

the last responsibility is the promotion of the
It

has to be repeated that the

task conferred

upon

this

System

will

ESCB

smooth operation of payment systems. 113

will not

have legal personality, and

that the

be carried out either by the European Central Bank

or by the different central banks of the

Member

States. If and

when

appropriate, the tasks

will

114
be executed decentralized (application of the principle of subsidiarity).

4.3.

Independence

4.3.1. Political Independence

The political independence of a
its

central

bank can be defined as

its ability to

choose

economic policy objectives autonomously, without constraints or influence from the

government. 115 In the Treaty of Maastricht,

lots

of attention has been dedicated to the

provisions that must guarantee the independence of the organs which will implement the

monetary policy. 116
* Article 107 states that neither the
instructions

when

ECB

nor a national central bank

may

seek or take

exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred

upon them by the Treaty [of Maastricht] and the Statute of the ESCB. 117
*

The

financial

means of the

ESCB

Member

States.

auditors.

The Court of Auditors

ECB. 118

The accounts of

are separated from those of the

the

System

will only

will

Community and

the

be audited by independent external

examine the operational efficiency of the

26
*

ECB

The

has

its

own

regulatory powers according to which

make recommendations and

take decisions,

deliver opinions.

* Additionally, the Treaty tries to ensure independence
that

board members are not tempted

staggering

of the

administration.

terms

so

that

to defer to the

members

all

it

can make regulations,

119

by nonrenewability of terms so
government

appointed

not

are

in

power, and by

by

same

the

120

In spite of these guarantees, certain ties with the political decision-making will

remain
*

to exist.

The Executive Board of

the

ECB

consists, as

president and four other members.

governments of the

Member

mentioned above, of a President, a vice-

They are appointed by common accord of

States at the level of heads of State or

Government. The

appointment follows a recommendation from the [ECO/FIN] Council after
consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council.

been fixed

at eight

years,

and

is

nonrenewable.

121

The term of

entered the third stage and of the

and Community
*

Members of

Members of

political influence

the Executive

may

the Executive

Member

fulfil

guilty

of misconduct

has

office has

the

States that

Board of the ECB. National

accordingly weigh on

its

composition.

122

Board and Governors of national central banks who no

the conditions required for the performance of their duties or

longer

it

The Governing Council of

System consists of the Governors of the national central banks of the

the

may be

relieved

from

office.

Executive Board are concerned, the Court of Justice

123

is

As

far

competent.

as

who have been

members of

the

For the Governors

of the national central banks, national arrangements remain possible, but decisions taken

on the basis of these rules may be referred
* Furthermore,

it

124
Court of Justice.

has been provided that the President of the

member of the Commission may

may submit

[ECO/FIN] Council and a

participate (without having the right to vote) in meetings

of the Governing Council of the

Council

to the

ECB. 125 Moreover,

a motion for deliberation.

126

On

the President of the

[ECO/FIN]

the other hand, the President of

27
the

ECB

be invited

will

to participate in

objectives and tasks of the
*

The

ECB

ESCB

Council meetings when matters relating to the

are discussed.

draw up an annual report on

will

127

the activities of the

ESCB

and on the

monetary policy of both the previous and current year. This report will be submitted
the

European Parliament, the [ECO/FIN] Council, the Commission and

Council.

The President of

European Parliament; the
been provided

the

latter

ECB

Board may, either

at their

own

will present this report to the Council

may

that the President

to the

hold a general debate on that basis.

of the

ECB

128

to

European

and
It

to the

has also

and the other members of the Executive

or at the request of the European Parliament, be heard

129
by the competent Committee of the European Parliament.

*

Some feedback may

be required

ESCB 130
made

4.3.2.

to

result

from the reporting commitments of the ECB. The

draw up and publish

at least quarterly

ECB

will

a report on the activities of the

131
and a weekly consolidated financial statement.
These documents will be

available to interested parties free of charge.

132

Economic Independence
Economic Independence

is

the ability to use without restrictions

instruments to pursue monetary policy goals.
the obligation to finance public deficits.

The Treaty
institutions.

national

The

forbids the

ECB

is

ECB

also

to

133

The most common

monetary policy

restraint appears to

be

134

open

lines of credit to

banned from participation

government bonds, while participation

in the

European or national public
in the

primary market for

secondary market

is

allowed

to

implement open market operations. 135

5.

THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE
At the

established;

136

start

at the

of the third stage, an Economic and Financial Committee will be

same

time, the

Monetary Committee

will

be dissolved.

137

At

this

28
point, there is

no longer need

for a

group of independent experts

to advise

on the

coordination of national monetary policy: from the beginning of the third stage, a

common monetary

policy will be conducted by a European System of Central Banks.

5.1. Structure

The Economic and Financial Committee

is

appointed by the

Member

States, the

Commission, and the ECB; each of which may appoint no more than two members
the Committee.

to

138

5.2. Tasks

The

tasks of this

Committee are broad; they are outlined

109c. 4. Specifically, the following responsibilities are within
-

to deliver opinions to the

Council or to the Commission

in Article 109c. 2.

its field

(at their

and

of competence:

request or on

its

own

initiative);

-

to

keep under review the economic and financial situation of the

the
-

Community, and

to report regularly thereon to the

to contribute to the preparation

to

examine,

at least

it

if

once a year, the situation regarding the movement of capital and

and as long as there are

will

Council and to the Commission;

by the Council;

the freedom of payments, and to report thereon to the
-

States and of

of certain works of the Council and to carry out other

advisory and preparatory tasks assigned to
-

Member

Member

Commission and

to the Council;

States with a derogation (see infra), the

Committee

keep under review the monetary and financial situation and the general payment

system of those

Member

Commission hereon.

States.

It

will regularly report to the Council

and the

29

CHAPTER

1.

4

THE TRANSITION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT EMU-STAGES

THE TRANSITION FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND STAGE
As mentioned

before,

the

second

and no

transition occurred automatically

stage

criteria

started

on

January

1

had to be met. Nevertheless,

1994.
it

139

The

had been

provided that the Council would, on the basis of a report from the Commission, assess
the progress

made with

2.

made with regard

economic and monetary convergence and the progress

to

the implementation of

Community law concerning

the internal market.

140

THE TRANSITION FROM THE SECOND TO THE THIRD STAGE

2.1. Criteria
It

was

clear very soon that

Deutschmark without guarantees

Germany would

not be prepared to give up the

for the credibility of the

new

currency.

The following

arrangement has been provided.

The Commission and
the fulfillment of the

the

Member

EMI will

report to the Council on the progress

made

in

States of their obligations regarding the achievement of a

economic and monetary union. 141 The report
national legislation, including the statutes of

will address

its

the compatibility of each

national central bank, with the Treaty.

Central in the report, however, will be the criteria of convergence which must be
fulfilled

-

by the Member

the rate of inflation

States:

142

must be close

States in terms of price stability;
-

the

to that of, at most, the three best

144

Member

143

government budgetary position may not show an excessive

Article 104c. 6;

performing

deficit in the sense

of

30
-

Member

the

States are expected to observe the

normal fluctuation margins provided for

by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System for
years, without devaluing against the currency of
-

may

the long-term interest-rate levels
that of, at most, the three best
stability.

The

any other

not exceed by

performing

Member

Member

at least

State;

two

145

more than two percentage

points

States in terms of price

146

reports will also take into account the development of the

ECU,

the results of the

integration of markets, the situation and development of the balances of

payments on

current account and an examination of the development of unit labor costs and other price
indices.

147

On

the basis of the reports, the

[ECO/FIN] Council

will, acting

by a qualified

majority of the votes and on a recommendation from the Commission, decide:
-

for each

Member

State,

whether

it

fulfills

148

the necessary conditions for the adoption of

a single currency;
-

whether a majority of the

Member

States fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption

of a single currency.

The [ECO/FIN] Council

will

formulate a recommendation to the Council in the

composition of the Heads of State or Government; the European Parliament will be
consulted and invited to forward

The Council, meeting
will at the latest
-

its

in the

opinion to the latter Council.

composition of the Heads of State or Government,

by 31 December 1996 decide: 149

whether a majority of the

Member

States fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption

of a single currency,
-

and whether

If the

it is

appropriate for the

Community

to enter the third stage.

Council formulates a positive answer on both questions,

beginning of the third stage.

it

will set the date for the

31

The Treaty provides

that, in

of the third stage has not been
case, the Council will, before

case by the end of 1997 the date for the beginning
this stage will start

set,

1

on

July 1988, confirm which

necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency.

2.2.

January 1999.

1

Member

15

°

In this

States fulfil the

151

Derogations
It is

stage.

to

be expected

The Treaty provides

a derogation."

152

as soon as they

Member

be abrogated.

States will enter simultaneously the third

have the

that the stragglers will

They are placed on a waiting

list to

have a derogation;

Member

this

Council

State with a derogation,

powers

"Member

States with

be reconsidered for participation

will, at least

every two years or

at

examine whether the derogations can

154

The most important arrangements concerning

Member

status of

meet the conditions. 153The [ECO/FIN] Council will decide which

States will

the request of a

Member

that not all

States with a derogation.

155

Accordingly, those

monetary policy.

in the field of

the third stage are not applicable to

156

The voting

Member

rights of

States retain their

Member

States with a

derogation will be suspended for the Council decisions based on articles which are not
applicable to them.

157

Their national central banks will be drawn into the European

System of Central Banks but important provisions
applicable to them.
will not

pay up

158

It

has also been provided that

their subscribed capital to the

decides that a minimal percentage of
costs of the

will

it

ECB

Member

System are not

States with a derogation

unless the General Council {see infra)

has to be paid as a contribution to the operational

European Central Bank. 159

As long
body

in the Statute of this

as there are

be constituted

Member

in the

ECB:

States with a derogation, a third decision-making

the General Council.

consist of the President and the Vice-President of the

national central banks.

The

other

members of

ECB

160

The General Council

will

and of the Governors of the

the Executive

Board may

participate,

32
without

having

the

right

vote,

to

of

meetings

in

General

the

responsibilities of the General Council are listed in full in Article

the

161

The

47 of the Statute [of

162
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank]. They

concentrate on the coordinating tasks of the

executed by the

EMI

which

in the third stage

have

to

be

ECB.

The Member

States with a derogation will

have

163
Furthermore, they
European Monetary System.

obligations of the second stage.
to

Council.

It

to

will

prove themselves

have

to

in a

renewed

comply with

all

the

has to be specified, however, that they will be obliged

avoid excessive government deficits (although no sanctions can be taken in case they

don't comply with this obligation).

2.3. Exceptions

164

for the United Kingdom and for Denmark

two countries.

In the Treaty of Maastricht, exceptions have been included for

Both the United Kingdom and Denmark asked and obtained exceptions relating

to the

transition to the third stage.

In a separate protocol

165
,

the United

Kingdom

is

assured that

obliged to enter the third stage without a separate decision by
Parliament. In case the United

Kingdom would decide

economic and monetary union,

it

that

of a

Member

have an ad hoc

State with a derogation.

The Danish

position

Danish participation
to a

will

is

it

only be abrogated at

its

to the third stage

request.

of

which can be compared with

of economic and monetary union

have the status of a

own

government and

also clarified in a separate protocol,

in the third stage

will

status,

move

cannot be

166

referendum. In case Denmark, on the basis of

to the third stage,

not to

its

it

this

Member

167

is

in

which the

made

subject

referendum, decides not to

State with a derogation

move

which can
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CHAPTER

1.

1

HISTORY

FROM THE INDEPENDENCE TO
The

British

colonies in North

1913

America suffered a shortage of

colonists had to seek constantly for additional forms of

commonly used

as a

medium of exchange. They were

bank notes and periodic note
tried to restrict

and

issues

from colonial

inhibit colonial paper.

The

money. Commodities were very
supplemented by merchant

later

legislatures.

They wanted

168

specie.

The

British,

to bring specie

however,

home and

feared

losses to their merchant creditors.

During the struggle for independence, the Continental Congress issued $242
million in paper

money

to finance the

Revolutionary War. The different states issued

another $209 million, while $8 million was borrowed in foreign specie. The

won

eventually

shambles.

170

its

military

The U.S.

and

political

Constitution situated the

the beginning at the federal level.

before an

-

The

initially

first

weak

-

major step

171

It

power

would

in this direction
172

1).

banking system and attempt

to

was

to

take,

central banking system

the United States (1791-181

interests

independence,

was

169

but

its

new

nation

finances were a

conduct monetary policy from

however, more than 120 years
set up.

the establishment of the First

Bank of

This bank was created to oversee the commercial

maintain a stable economy.

173

Agrarian and

prevented rechartering of the national bank in 1811.

state

bank

174

The war of 1812,

however, proved the need for a reliable note issue and a strong method of federal

government borrowing. 175

33

34

As a

result, the

Second Bank of the U.S. was

took up a role as a modern central bank, but
activity. State banks,

to its control

177

up

1816.

in

176

This bank never

at least established the potential for

however, did their utmost

of their operations.

set

to fight the

Although the

bill to

such

bank because they objected

renew the charter passed both

houses of Congress, the Second Bank of the United States was liquidated in 1836 because
President Jackson vetoed charter extension.

The

first

178

era of "central bank" development in the U.S.

decentralized banks were to

become

American banking

the dominant tradition in

The period between 1836 and 1863

known

is

was ended. Local,

as the free banking era.

history.

Between

those dates, states served as sole chartering authority for banking institutions.

War,

In 1863, during the Civil
legislation.

banks.

it

The National Bank Act of 1863 179 encouraged

The Comptroller of

the Currency

supervision of the national banks.

180

panics and depressions

2.

-

that a real

to

adopt stronger federal

federal chartering of state

would be responsible for the screening and

However, the tendencies toward decentralized

charter banking resumed their influence.

in the

proved possible

It

was not

1913

until

move was made towards

-

and

after three

state

major

"central bank" regulation

European sense.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT OF
At the end of the 19th and

at the

1913

beginning of the 20th century, several banking

panics occurred in the United States, culminating with a major crisis in 1907.

181

This

motivated another attempt to establish a central bank. 182 The Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 30

June

1908 183 was a direct result of the

latter

crisis.

184

The

act

provided for the

issuance of an emergency currency and for the appointment of a National Monetary

Commission. 185 The Commission was asked

to carry

on an investigation of banking

systems and to report thereon to Congress with a view to the adoption of a permanent

reform measure. 186The results were published

in a series

of many volumes. 187Senator

35
Aldrich introduced his

own

188

plan

it

"financial interests" of

bank

Com mission. The

together with the report of the
objection being that

for a central

in

Congress on 8 January 1912,

plan was not acted upon, the main

meant too great a centralization of power
Wall

Street.

189

in the

hands of the

Meanwhile, on 26 June 1913, Carter Glass (head

of the House Banking and Currency Committee) introduced a counter proposal, which
after being modified

known

as the

by the Senate Banking Committee chaired by Senator Owen, became

Owen-Glass

Bill.

190

The Federal Reserve

bankers, various business organizations and
questions,

191

was signed

into

some

Act,

writers on

although opposed by

economic and

financial

law on 23 December 1913 by President Wilson. 192 The

Act was passed "to provide for the establishment of Federal Reserve Banks,

to furnish

an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a

more
was
its

effective supervision of banking in the United States,

as far as the United States could

history.

and for other purposes.

go toward central bank regulation

It

at that stage in

194

The Federal Reserve System assumed gradually
reforms (1933-1935). The real independence for the

greater powers with the

new monetary

New Deal
was only

structure

achieved by the "Accord of 1951" with the Treasury. 195 In the following chapter,
discuss the parts that
today.

" 193

compose

the Federal Reserve

System as they

exist

we

will

and work

196

CHAPTER

2

INSTITUTIONAL

The "Fed"

as

it

FRAMEWORK

exists today,

has five major components.

We

will discuss

successively the Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve District Banks, the

Banks, the Federal Open Market Committee and the Advisory Committees.

Member

36
1.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS

1.1. Structure

The Board of Governors
in

Washington, D.C.

States,

197

is

composed of seven individual members with

The members

are appointed by the President of the United

198
They hold
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

a nonrenewable

199

offices

their office for

term of 14 years. 200 The starting terms have been staggered so that

one term expires every even-numbered year. 201 The Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the

Board are designated by the President of the United States from among the members

of the Board; each to serve for four years.
approval.

202

Their appointment

is

subject to Senate

203

1.2. Tasks

The prime
policy.

function of the Board of Governors

Additionally,

the

is

the formulation of monetary

Board has supervisory and regulatory powers over the

operations of the Federal Reserve District Banks and over the activities of commercial

banks.

1.2.1.

204

Monetary Policy

The

responsibility for

important task, although

this function

original Federal Reserve Act.

the Federal

body

monetary policy

205

widely considered to be the Fed's most

was not one of

The members of

Open Market Committee

in the field

is

the

the purposes envisioned in the

Board constitute a majority within

(see infra), the

most important decision- making

of monetary policy. 206 The Board also fixes the reserve requirements

for depository institutions,

207

reviews and approves the discount rates of the Federal

Reserve Banks 208 and issues regulations governing the administration of their discount

37

window. 209 In addition, the Board
stock market.

sets

margin requirements on credit purchases

210

1.2.2. Regulatory

Powers

In addition to

its

responsibilities in the field of

monetary policy, the Board of

Governors has extensive power over most banking operations
*

A

in the

United States. 211

power

blanket clause in the Federal Reserve Act gives the Board the

"general supervision" over the Federal Reserve District Banks.

power

examine them, 213

to

borrowing members 215 and
can permit

(or,

to

ask for reports,

to regulate their

217

214

set

212

the discount rates

they allow

216

The Board

under certain conditions, require) Federal Reserve Banks

Banks

at rates

upon the books and balance

218

to rediscount

of interest to be fixed by

The Board of Governors may remove or suspend any

of any Federal Reserve Bank,

to exercise

This includes the

check clearing operations.

the discounted paper of other Federal Reserve
the Board.

officer or director

require the writing off of doubtful or worthless assets

sheets.

219

It

can even suspend (for the violation of the

Federal Reserve Act) the operations of any Federal Reserve Bank, liquidate
reorganize

in the

220
it.

The Board

also supervises the relations

it,

or

between the different Reserve

Banks and foreign banks. 221
*

The Board of Governors,

together with several other agencies

commercial banking system of the United

States.

222
,

also regulates the

The Board of Governors

exercises

supervisory authority over both national banks and the state banks that choose to

members of

the Federal Reserve

System

(see infra).

become

The Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation exercises a residual supervisory authority over those entities and a more
direct

authority

over

state

nonmember banks

that

are

federally

insured.

223

The

respective competencies of the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation thus overlap with the primary authority of the Comptroller of the Currency

over national banks and the primary authority of state bank supervisors over

state

38
banks.

over

224

The Federal Reserve Board has

225
and
bank holding companies

operations of foreign banks.

1.3.

also administrative

residual

and enforcement powers

power over

supervisory

all

U.S.

226

Means
The Board of Governors

Banks an assessment

is

sufficient to

entitled to levy semiannually

pay

its

upon the Federal Reserve

working expenses. 227

FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT BANKS

2.

2.1. Structure

The Federal Reserve District Banks

are federally chartered corporations,

managed

228
Six members are elected by the member
and directed by a board of nine directors.

banks (see

B

A

infra) in the district (three Class

directors,

usually

businesspeople).

229

appointed by the Board of Governors.

directors, usually bankers,

The

230

others

(three

Class

C

and three Class
directors)

The Board designates one of

the Class

directors as chairman of the board of directors and as "Federal reserve agent."

the

two other Class

The
in such a

directors will be appointed

by the

of Governors

One of

said board as deputy chairman.

that

each year a

may suspend

new

director for each class

is

appointed.

23

'The Board

or remove officers of the Reserve Banks for cause.

232

president and vice president of the banks 's board are appointed by the board

of directors with the approval of the Board of Governors. 233The president
absence, the vice president)
is

C

directors hold their office for a term of three years; the terms are staggered

way

The

C

are

fixed at five years.

is

(or, in his

the chief executive officer of the Bank; his term of office

234

The Board of Governors can permit or

require any District

Bank

to establish

branch banks. These branches will be operated under the supervision of a board of

39
directors

composed of

three to seven people, of

The remaining

the District Bank.

whom

a majority of one

directors are appointed

is

appointed by

by the Board of Governors. The

Directors of the branch banks hold their office "during the pleasure of the Board of

Governors"; moreover, the Board of Governors can

Banks

to discontinue

any of

their branches.

-

at

any time

require the District

-

235

2.2. Tasks

Although the Board of Governors dominates the monetary policy, an important
role is left for the different Reserve Banks.

As members of

the Federal

Open Market

Committee, the presidents of five of the Reserve Banks help determine the objectives and

monetary targets of the Federal Reserve System. The Directors of the Reserve Banks can
also initiate changes in the discount rate (subject to confirmation

Governors).

236

Furthermore, the Reserve Banks make important contributions to the

monetary debates

in

the Federal

Open Market Committee;

regulation of banks j^and they provide financial services.

2.3.

by the Board of

they play a role in the

238

Means
Each Member Bank

District

Bank equal

to

to the capital stock is

entitled to voting

{see infra) is required to purchase an

6% 239 of

its

own

capital stock

possiblej^stock not held by

power.

amount of stock

and surplus.

in its

240

Public subscription

member banks

is,

however, not

242

The earnings of the

District

Banks derive primarily from

interest received

on

their

holdings of securities acquired through open market operations, on System holdings of
foreign currencies and on their loans to
District

Banks have included

institutions.

244

The

member

banks.

243

Since 1981, earnings of the

fees for various services that they provide to depository

profits are paid

back

to the

Treasury. 245

40
3.

MEMBER BANKS
National Banks (banks chartered by the federal government)

the Federal Reserve System;

may become members of
Governors.

247

The same

the

246

state-chartered

Fed

if

become members of

commercial banks or

trust

companies

they meet specific requirements of the Board of

possibility exists for

mutual savings banks.

248

Member

banks

are required to purchase stock in their Federal Reserve District Bank. This stock
traded in a secondary market

4.

249

and pays a dividend of

6%

annually.

is

not

250

FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE

4.1. Structure

Until 1922, the different District Banks bought and sold government securities

independently.

231

^ May

the Federal Reserve

up.

252

The main

1922, a Governors Committee, consisting of the governors of

Banks of Boston, Chicago,

task of the

Committee was

to

New York

and Philadelphia was

make recommendations

to the

set

Reserve

Banks concerning open market operation s.^It was, however unclear whether the
recommendations were binding and whether the District Banks retained the right
conduct open market operations on their individual

Reserve Board 255 reorganized

this

different District Banks.

recommended by
that they

approve.

the

257

By

and the Board.

This Committee,

Some

together with the

operations to the

right to opt out of the operations

District

Bank

officials asserted

even

conduct open market operations of which the Board did not

the end of the 1920s, there

in the southern

256

Those banks had, however, the

to

In 1923, the Federal

made recommendations on open market

OMIC

had the right

254

Governors Committee into a so-called Open Market

Investment Committee [hereinafter OMIC].
Federal Reserve Board,

initiative.

to

and western

states

was a growing opposition against

(who were not represented

in the

the

OMIC

Committee); they

considered the institution to be a "power-hungry, extra-legal body not provided for by

41
the Federal Reserve Act."

the

OMIC

new

institution

the District

OMPC]

had

still

Banks could

OMPC. 259 The OMPC

26(

This

moment

still

Districts

were

statute

in

district.

261

final say

[hereinafter

gave

emergency

FOMC]

elected

FOMC

from

The

initiating

District

situations

is

Banks from among

264

at this

different

their

own;

to

buy government

afford relief to financial institutions in their

to

created the current structure of

the decisions of this institution binding.

made up of

the

members of

262

the Board of Governors and of

by the board of directors of the twelve Federal Reserve
and vice-presidents. The

New York

District

members

are

banks as determined on a rotating basis 263 (the presidents

may

Traditionally, the

265

the

engage in open market operations

Banks were even permitted

their presidents

district

The

open market operations on

participate in the

FOMC

elects the

FOMC

meetings but are not allowed

chairman of the Board of Governors as

chairman and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of

chairman.

which was

representative in the Committee; the other four

of the other District Banks
to vote).

recommended by

finally legal standing to the institution,

elected annually

by the other

Policy

which was established by the Banking Act

the right to refuse to

still

Bank has a permanent

Open Market

over the conduct of open market operations:

The Federal Reserve Amendments of 1935

members

District

with the so-called

representatives of all twelve District Banks.

the Board.

Today, the
five

it

which the twelve District Banks were represented.

Open Market Committee and made

the

its

in

explicitly prohibited

recommended by
securities

to replace

decline to engage in operations

still

composed of

however,

they had,

no

Federal Reserve Board decided to dissolve

result, the

can be considered as the fore-runner of the present Federal

Open Market Committee
of 1933.

As a

March 1930, and

in

Conference [hereinafter
This

258

New York

as

its

vice

42
4.2. Tasks

Congress has given the
operations.

266

FOMC

complete authority over the open

The Federal Open Market Committee meets about every

six

market

weeks

to

review economic conditions and discuss the appropriate monetary policy to improve the
national

FOMC

economy and prevent adverse

conditions from erupting.

prepares a policy directive for the manager of the System

(SOMA),

a vice-president of the Federal Reserve District

267

At

its

meetings, the

Open Market Account

Bank of

New

York. This

directive states the general direction of policy and sets targets for variables such as the

federal funds rate, the level of free reserves, and the various monetary aggregates.

Trading Desk (Open Market Desk)

at the

New York

Federal Reserve District Bank will

carry out the necessary purchases and sales of securities.

The

directive adopted at a certain meeting

meeting, along with a policy record of the

economic and
votes taken.

financial situation, the

269

According

to the

shifts in interest rates that

is

The

268

released shortly after the following

FOMC's

assessment of the country's

members' discussion of policy and a record of the

FOMC,

the delay is necessary to avoid the sudden

would accompany an announcement and make government

borrowing more expensive. 270

The domestic open market operations
The Federal Reserve

District

are the exclusive province of the

Banks may not engage

market trading except according

to the directions

FOMC.

(or decline to engage) in

open

given by the Federal Open Market

Committee. 271

From
been

time to time, the role of the District Bank Presidents within the

criticized. Bernstein

272

summarizes the main objections as follows:

FOMC

Although the
has complete control over the
purchase and sale of government securities by the Federal
Reserve Banks, one of the chief instruments of monetary
policy, almost half of

its

members

the President, nor confirmed

are neither appointed by

by the Senate, nor are they
removable except for cause. They are selected by members
of the banking community, the very constituents that the

FOMC

has

43

FOMC
FOMC

is

supposed

to regulate.

The composition of

thus raises questions about the accountability of

those responsible for the monetary policy

The

constitutionality of the Federal

confirmed.

5.

the

273

[...]

Open Market Committee

has,

however, always been

274

ADVISORY COMMITTEES

5.1. Federal Advisory Council

The Federal Advisory Council was
bankers from the Fed
elected

275

This Council consists of one

at least four times

a year in Washington, D.C.;

The Federal Advisory

issues.

The members

The Board of Governors

execute the recommendations of the Federal Advisory Council.

5.2.

District,

makes recommendations

it

Board of Governors about economic and banking-related

carry information back to the banks in their areas.
to

member from each

District Banks.

by the board of directors of the respective

Council meets
to the

itself.

created in an effort to soften the exclusion of

is

also

not obliged

276

Consumer Advisory Council

The Consumer Advisory Council comprises 30 members, who represent
financial

institutions

the

and their consumers. The Council meets with the Board of

Governors four times a year

to discuss

consumer-related issues.

277

5.3. Thrift Institutions Advisory Council

The

Thrift Institutions Advisory Council

is

made up of

12 representatives of the

savings banks, savings and loan associations and credit unions.
issues related to these types of financial institutions.

278

Its

task

is to

advise on

44

CHAPTER

3

INDEPENDENCE

POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

1.

The

Fed

operates

relatively

from

free

executive

and

congressional

controls. ^'The following provisions try to assure the independence of the System.

*

The President appoints

terms.

280

partially

The terms

the

members of

are not renewable;

the

Board of Governors for fourteen-year

however, an individual appointed

to

fill

a

completed term can be re-appointed. The terms are staggered; one term expires

every two years, thus limiting the number of appointments a President can make during
his

term in office.

281

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of

the President for a (renewable) four year term.

are only removable by the President for cause.
*

The Board does

282

Members of

not depend on Congress for

how

its

The Board

is

Board of Governors

operating funds:

these funds will be spent.

284

its

it

it

These funds are not part of the
285

not required to obtain advance approval from the Office of

and Budget or any other federal agency prior

can levy an

operating expenses, and

federal budget and, thus, not subject to congressional review.
*

the

283

assessment against the Reserve Banks to supply funds for

can freely choose

Board are appointed by

the

Management

to testifying before or submitting legislating

proposals to Congress. Moreover, the Board can normally not be required to submit
legislative

recommendations, or testimony, or comments on legislation prior

submission to Congress.

However,

it

286

should be noted that the Board of Governors

in the Federal Administrative

Act.

288

to their

is

subject to the checks

Procedure Act287 and the Government

in

the Sunshine

Furthermore, the Fed must submit to Congress two independent written reports

every year on developments in the national economy, objectives in monetary policy and
the relations between the objectives of the Fed, Congress and the President. 289
is

also expected to submit an annual report

on

its

operations

290

and

it

is

The Fed

obliged to

45

Bank and

publish a weekly statement showing the condition of each Federal Reserve

consolidated statement for

Federal Reserve Banks.

all

291

A man

a

points out that the

chairman and governors frequently speak before congressional committees about

monetary matters.

292

Furthermore,

there

are

lots

of informal contacts with other

293
policymaking groups within the government.

The Federal Reserve System can be considered

be rather independent from a

of view. However, the Board of Governors

political point

to characterize the

2.

to

System

as "independent within the

itself finds

government."

it

more accurate

294

ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE
As mentioned

bank

before, the main threat to the

the obligation to finance public deficits.

is

the Federal Reserve

System as

295

economic independence of a central

There are no

problems here for

real

far as the direct credit facilities are concerned.

major difference with the European System of Central Banks

is

that the

The only
Fed does

participate in the primary market for public debt.

3.

FORMAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE INDEPENDENCE
The above

independent.

discussion

However,

suggests

several

that

the

Federal Reserve

commentators argue

that

in

System

spite

of

this

appearance of independence, the Fed frequently reflects government policy
clear

by

whom

and in what manner the System

is

influenced. Cargill

297

of influence from the government to the
[Federal Reserve System] are many, complex, and not time

and

there

remains

whether they can be modeled

considerable

296
.

rather

formal
It is

argues that

[t]he channels

invariant

is

controversy

in

any systematic manner.

They involve pressure brought by

the president, Congress,

and within Congress, the Senate Banking Committee, as
well as elements of the private sector through their
influence on government. Many of the pressures revolve

not

46
around the [Federal Reserve System's] overriding concern
with maintaining its "independence" within the government

framework and yet as

if in

a

game with no

solution, the

[Federal Reserve System] frequently conducts policy in

accordance

with

whatever

force

will

ensure

its

"independence."

It is,

of course, impossible

System of Central Banks

will

to say at this

moment how independent

be from a substantive point of view.

American experience should be an important caveat for Europe.

the

European

However,

the

TITLE IV

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER

1

DISCUSSION

The European System of Central Banks and
look rather similar

at first sight.

the Federal Reserve

Both consist of one central

Bank versus Board of Governors) and twelve

institution

System might

(European Central

regional banks. Although Europe certainly

found inspiration in the federal structure of the American central banking system,
the differences

1.

between the two systems are as

298

striking as the similarities.

THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE TWO SYSTEMS
The

first

and most obvious difference between the two systems

The European System of Central Banks
Reserve System

is

finds

its

is

their legal basis.

basis in a Treaty while the Federal

based on an Act of Congress.

The Treaty of Maastricht (and

its

protocols) can only be changed by

consensus. Article 106 of the Treaty provides that

some

articles

common

of the Statute of the

European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank may be amended

by the Council, but the

articles in question are not related to the objectives

and tasks of

the System, the constitution thereof, or the provisions protecting

its

The Fed, on

any time change

the other hand,

is fully

aware

that

Congress can

at

independence.

299

its

mandate, responsibilities, or powers. 30OThis might be an indication that the European

System of Central Banks

will

be somewhat more independent than the Federal Reserve

System.

47

48
2.

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
There appears

to

be

a

relation

macroeconomic performance. Different

between

central

studies prove that there

bank independence and
is

a

between the independence of a central bank and the inflation

statistical relationship

rate.

301

The European

System of Central Banks should, therefore, be as independent as possible.
Central bank independence

is,

of course, not to be taken

not placed in a vacuum; there will always be certain

is

ties

literally.

A central bank

with political decision-

302
making. Cargill rightly points out that "[t]he distinction between different degrees of

independence

is

necessarily vague since

or could be, completely isolated from

no one argues
its

that the central

institutional

devised a meaningful index of independence that

is

bank should

be,

environment and no one has

time and country invariant.

of parameters to "measure" the independence of a central bank will, for

"

Any

set

this reason,

always be somewhat arbitrary. However, following data can give an idea about the
situation in

Political

Europe and the United

States.

303

Independence

1

2

Federal Reserve

E.S.C.B.

*

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

*

*

*

*

*

5

*

*

*

*

*

6

Notes

=
=
=

Governor not appointed by government
Governor appointed for >5 years
3
Board not appointed by government
4 = Board appointed for > 5 years
5 = No mandatory participation of government representative in board
6 = No government approval of monetary policy is required
7 = Statutory requirement that central bank pursues monetary stability
8 = Explicit conflicts between bank and government are possible
9 = Overall index of political independence, constructed as the number of
1

2

asterisks in

columns 1-8

49

Economic Independence

1

2

3

4

Federal Reserve

*

*

*

*

E.S.C.B.

*

*

*

*

5

*

6

7

8

9

*

*

*

7

*

*

*

8

Notes
1

2
3

4
5
6

7
8

9

= Direct credit facility: not automatic
= Direct credit facility: market interest rate
= Direct credit facility: temporary
= Direct credit facility: limited amount
= Central bank does not participate in primary market for public debt
= Discount rate set by central bank
= No portfolio constraints in place since 1980
= No bank loan ceilings in place since 1980
= Overall index of economic independence (being the number of asterisks

These data suggest

that the

ESCB

will

in

columns

1-8)

be even more independent than the Federal

Reserve System. However, as mentioned above, 304 a distinction should be drawn

between formal and substantive central bank independence.

how

3.

independent the

ESCB

will

It is

impossible to predict

be from a substantive point of view.

REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES
The

basic responsibilities of every central bank are to maintain price stability and

provide lender of
varying

degrees

supervision.

306

The

last resort services.

of

responsibility

Federal

Reserve

supervisory and regulatory functions.
[it]

305

brings to

its

In addition hereto, central banks have
in

the

field

System,

for

The Fed claims

of

financial

example,

regulation

conducts

that

decisions on supervisory and regulatory

matters a wide perspective on the financial markets and an

awareness of the general effects that actions affecting
depository institutions

may have on

other sectors of the

assumed
and

extensive

50

economy. Experience gained in the process of supervision
and regulation also enables monetary policy decisions to be
made against the background of a more practical and
knowledgeable assessment of how such decisions will flow
through and interact with the banking and depository
307
system and financial markets generally.
It

has also been argued that a lender of

credit risk

it

to restrict the

amount of

308

however, important drawbacks related

are,

banking and regulatory responsibilities.
is

must be able

assumes under such operations through supervision and regulation of the

financial sector.

There

last resort

It

appears to

me

to the

that the

combination of central

most important objection

the fact that conflicts might arise because of the differing objectives of

and financial regulation. Bank supervision and regulation

is

assuring a safe and sound banking system while monetary policy

monetary policy

directed essentially at
is

concerned primarily

with providing a monetary framework within which there can be economic growth

without inflation.

bank

is

309

This brings along several problems.

first

problem

is that

a central

supposed to develop an economy-wide perspective for the conduct of monetary

policy. Financial regulation,

industry perspective.

bank may

for the

monetary authority

loss

on the other hand, brings along a tendency

According

central

to

Cargill

310

the danger exists that

authority normally

is

to

adopt an

"ultimately,

the

independence in ways that are not too dissimilar to the pressure
to

accommodate government

that while a financial regulatory authority should

opposed

to this

deficits."

A

second problem

is

encourage innovation, the monetary

because the possible effects on the demand and
311

Another drawback

the fact that monetary policy requires a long-run orientation,

whereas financial

supply for
is

A

money might

interfere with

money and

credit controls.

regulation tends to focus on the short run. Cargill argues that "the assumption of major

regulatory responsibilities given their short-run and immediate nature

is

inconsistent with

the time-frame required for achieving long-run price stability because

it

constantly forces

the monetary authority to adopt a first things first perspective.

" 312

51

The Treaty of Maastricht
supervisory

authority.

competence
it

313

In

the

not desirable.

is

314

ECB

offers the possibility of designating the

light

of what has been said,

In case the

ESCB

should assume complete responsibility in this

as a

such a transferal

of

takes up regulatory responsibilities,

field. Cargill

States the multiplicity of regulatory authorities has resulted in

notes that "[i]n the United

numerous

inconsistencies,

duplication of functions, failure to achieve agency responsibility, and encouraged a type

of financial innovation that
certainly

It is

practices.

set

316

ultimately unstable."

no solution

by the

central

keep the regulatory and supervisory responsibilities

bank branch with the minimal regulatory and supervisory

might be worth considering the establishment of a European "super-

It

agency" to supervise the financial
at this

to

315

Without centralized control, the standards for the Community will

decentralized.

probably be

is

moment

-

institutions.

politically impossible.

It

However,

I

am

afraid that this

is - at least

has been very difficult to have the Treaty of

Maastricht ratified; such an amendment would certainly provoke too

many adverse

reactions.

4.

FEDERAL VERSUS REGIONAL INTERESTS
The

original text of the Federal Reserve

Act did not

settle

the relationship

between the 12 Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve Board.
factors

made

the Federal Reserve District

of the System.

318

The Banking Act of 1933, however, along with

1935 made the focus of power
Governors.

319

Banks hold a dominant role

0nly

after these

shift

the

new

Several

in the early years

the Banking Act of

from the 12 Reserve Banks

amendments did

317

institution

to

the

come

Board of
to

operate

smoothly. 320
In Europe, the national central banks are likely to hold a dominant position.
first

reason for this

Maastricht.

is

the principle of subsidiarity that

As mentioned above,

this principle

means

is

The

introduced by the Treaty of

that all tasks should

be executed

"

52
at the

lowest appropriate level

reason

is

the fact that within the

Governing Council
position).

clear

The

answer

(in

that

ECB,

A

the most important decisions will be taken

second

by the

which the governors of the national central banks have a majority

principle of subsidiarity

to the question

lowest "appropriate" level
that the

preferably by the national central banks).

(i.e.,

what

is in

is

however, rather vague. Moreover, there

is,

going to happen

a particular case.

answer might be given by the Court of

if there is

321

It

no

discussion on what the

The provisions of

Justice.

is

the Treaty suggest

can be doubted, however,

monetary policy decisions can wait for a court decision.
Eichengreen

322

thinks that the early history of the Federal Reserve System should

be read as a cautionary

Since residual uncertainty remains in Europe over the locus

tale.

of control (regional versus federal), the monetary unification might be followed by a
period in which national central banks

test the limits

demonstrate to the newly established European
considerable degree of autonomy.
central banks in
entirely

of the

324

Europe

is politically

new european

impossible

central

The suggestion of

at the

carry

nations.

325

it

out

According

while

still

Bank

ECB

The

2

they

retain

a

or of eliminating them

moment. However, the "the governing board

powers

giving

to Jones, this is the

to centralize

to effectively

adequate

voice

"main lesson"

decisionmaking and

formulate monetary policy

that

eighty years of central banking experience in the United States.

CHAPTER

that

the author to reduce the existing

offices of the

bank should promptly seek

to acquire sufficient explicitly defined

and

Central

323

mere branch

to

of their autonomy and try to

to

all

12

member

Europe can learn from
326

CONCLUSION

blueprint for a European

Monetary Union looks very promising. The Treaty

of Maastricht provides for a rather independent European central banking system by the

end of the century.

53

There

are,

however, some caveats.

about the independence of the future

might be

important

an

difference

First,

one should not be too overoptimistic

ESCB. The American experience shows
between formal and

central

bank

Second, the European Central Bank should not take up regulatory

independence.
responsibilities.

As

stated above, the best solution for

Europe would be

"super-agency" to supervise the financial institutions. This
unthinkable at the moment.

probably to give the
institutions in

substantive

that there

ECB

The second

best solution

to create a

however,

is,

politically

from a theoretical point of view

is

complete authority to supervise and regulate the financial

Europe. Third, analogous to what happened in the early days of the

ESCB

Federal Reserve System, the

might have

to experience that controversies

over the

locus of control (regional versus federal) should have been solved before the Systems

begins operating and that efficiency requires transnational control.
It

will probably take

some time before

operate smoothly. Furthermore,
stage III simultaneously.

At

the criteria of convergence.

of the

ECU

as the single

this

The

it is

the

327

newly established

Member

not very likely that the twelve

assertion of certain

European currency

will

commentators

be determinative

However, once the system operates smoothly and
the

begins to

States enter

moment, only Luxembourg, France and Denmark meet
that the introduction
in the establishing

a "European identity", might, for these reasons, be overoptimistic.

participating,

ESCB

all

of

328

Member

States are fully

Monetary Union might open new perspectives for Europe. The

monetary policies of the new European Central Bank will have far more important
spillovers than those of

any of the existing central banks

even be a serious challenger for the role of the

means of payment,

unit of account

US

in

Europe. 329The

dollar as the

and store of value. 330

ECU

will

dominant international
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.De toekomstige rol van de ECU op weg naar een Economische en Monetaire Unie (Tfie
future role of the ECU on the road towards an economic and monetary union), 327
1

Bulletin van de Generale Bank, 1992,

2.

2.Ivo Maes, Monetaire Integratie (Monetary Integration),

Economisch en Sociaal

Tudschrift, 1991, 191.

Delors report (see infra) or "Report of the Committee for the Study of Economic
and Monetary Union", Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European
3. The

Communities, 1989,

states

on

this topic (s. 23):

The adoption of a

single

currency,

while not

strictly

necessary for the creation of a monetary union might be
seen as a natural and desirable further development of the

monetary

union.

A

single

currency

would

clearly

demonstrate the irreversibility of the monetary union,

management of the
Community and avoid the transactions costs of converting
currencies. The replacement of national currencies by a
considerably facilitate the monetary

single currency should therefore take place as soon as

possible after the locking of parities.

4. Maes,

supra note

2, at

193-194.

The European Commission has made an evaluation of
monetary union

in

Europe, and concluded that

it

the effects of an

economic and

would have important advantages

as for

One Market, One Money, An Evaluating of
the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union,
European Economy (No. 44), Brussels, 1990; and The Economics of EMU, European
efficiency,

growth and price

Economy

(Special Edition), 1991.

5. The

stability (see:

EEC-Treaty contains only few 'monetary' provisions. This can be explained
mainly by the international monetary situation at the time the Treaty was drafted.
According to Whytock, pressure for monetary cooperation within the EC was weak "due
to the stable prevailing international monetary conditions, and the satisfactory functioning
of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg system." (See Christopher A. Whytock, Eurofed:
Toward a European System of Central Banks and a European Central Bank, 23 Law &
Pol'Y INT'L Bus. 469, 484. It should be noted, however, that monetary cooperation in
Europe began before the creation of the different European Communities. In 1950, the
European Payments Union had been set up in order to multilateralize European trade
and payments and in order to provide a framework for moving to convertibility. See
Peter B. Kenen, Group of Thirty, EMU After Maastricht 3 (1992).

"
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6. The

only operational effect of

of Central Bank Governors

7. This

summit was held on

8. Rapport

1

plan has been the establishment of the Committee

and 2 December 1969.

l'Union

concernant

this

in 1964.

Economique

et

Monetaire

dans

Supplement au Bulletin, 1970 OJ. (C 36)

11.

The Report

monetary union by 1980.

called for the establishment of

9.1971 O.J. (C28)

10. The plan

le

Communaute,

1.

provided in the establishment of an economic and monetary union over a

period of ten years and in three stages.

11.1972 O.J. (C 38)

3.

12.The Single European Act [1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 29] introduced a chapter on
"Cooperation in Economic and Monetary Policy (Economic and Monetary Union)" under
Title II (Economic Policy) of the EEC Treaty.

13. Article

102a

states in relevant part: "Insofar as further

economic and monetary policy necessitates
236 shall be applicable.

14. The so-called Delors

development

in the field of

institutional changes, the provisions

of Article

Committee was composed of Jacques Delors, Frans Andriessen,

12 Member States and three experts:
Alexandre Lamfalussy (Belgium), Niels Thygesen (Denmark) and Miguel Boyer (Spain).
the Presidents of the

Central Banks of the

15. A. Steinherr notes very cynically that such

German Mark
15.)

(cf.

EMU

-

an

ECU

Scenarios for Stage Two,

would be nearly the same

ECU-Newsletter

as the

January 1991,
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December 1989, the Strasbourg Summit decided to convene an Intergovernmental
Conference in December 1990. In June 1990, the Dublin Summit decided that two
16. In

conferences were necessary: one on

17.The draft Treaty

18. Article

text

can be found

R.2 of the Treaty

provided that

all

EMU
in

and the other on

1992 O.J. (C 191)

political union.

1.

states that "[it] shall enter into force

on

January 1993,

1

the instruments of ratification have been deposited, or, failing that, on

the first day of the

month following the deposit of the ratification by the last signatory
The Treaty of Maastricht entered into force on 1 November

State to take this step."

1993.

19. This

was possible because

the first stage of

EMU

would only

changes in the

entail

and operation of existing institutions. These changes were introduced by way of
Council Decision 90/142/EEC [1990 O.J. (L 78)] which amended Decision 64/300/EEC
[1964 O.J. (L 77)] on cooperation between the central banks of the Member States of the
role

European Economic Community, and by Council Decision 90/141/EEC [1990 O.J. (L
78)] on the attainment of a progressive convergence of economic policies and
performance during stage one of Economic and Monetary Union. The latter decision
repeals Council Decision 74/120/EEC on the attainment of a high degree of convergence
of the economic policies of the Member States of the European Community and Council
Directive 74/121/EEC on stability, growth and full employment in the Community.

20.This was decided

at the

Madrid Summit (June 1989); the beginning of the

coincided with the entering into force of the directive concerning a free
capital

which was adopted

in

21.Article 103.2.

22. Article 103.3.

first

stage

June 1988 by the Council Directive 88/361/EEC, [1988

O.J. (L 178) 5].

23. Article 103.4,

first

movement of

paragraph.

24. Article 103.4, second paragraph.
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25. It can be derived from the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice that the

measures decided on are binding. In the Schluter Case, the Court decided that the
Council may take all measures provided for in article 189 of the Treaty (cf. 1973 E.C.R.
1135). Article 103a.

1

has a permanent nature; the possibility in which this article

provides does not end with the

first stage.

26. Article 109e.2(a) and Article 73b.
full effect after 1

It

should be noted that this arrangement only took

January 1994.

27.Article 109e.2(a) and Article 104.

28. Article 109e.2(a) and Article 104a.

The

1.

prohibition will only take full effect in the second stage; at this point, the

Member

States are only expected to take provisional measures.

The United Kingdom obtained that it may maintain its "Ways and Means" facility with
the Bank of England if and so long as the United Kingdom does not move to the third
stage (See Article 11 of the Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United

Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland).

29. Article 109e.2(a).

30.Article 109e.2(b).

Monetary Committee which exists since 1958 (cf. Article 105 EEC Treaty) will
its operations, and finds a place in the new Article 109c. From the beginning
of the third stage, an Economic and Financial Committee will replace the Monetary
Committee.
31. The

continue

32.See 1989 O.J. (C 241)

1.

33. Article 109e.l.

34. Article 3.1 of the Protocol

on the Statute of the European Monetary

Institute.
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35. Pursuant to Article 73e, restrictions

on movements of capital which are authorized on

31 December 1993, can be maintained until 31 December 1995

allowed

restrictions

Movements

may

find a basis in the Directive

or in Article 108 of the

EEC

at the latest.

The

on Complete Freedom of Capital
is of importance to

Treaty. This provision

Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece.

on the basis of public policy and
be provided for to prevent
infringements of national laws and regulations (particularly in the field of taxation and
the prudential supervision of financial institutions). At the same time, procedures are
36. Pursuant to Article 73d, exceptions are allowed

Furthermore,

security.

necessary

arrangements

can

allowed for the declaration of capital movements "for purposes of administrative or
statistical

information".

national tax laws

In the tax field,

it

has been provided that provisions of the

which distinguish between tax-payers who are not

in the

same

situation

with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital
invested remain possible (a declaration on Article 73e

Member

makes

is

clear that this possibility

which
exist at the end of 1993). The measures and procedures referred to in Article 73d shall
not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free
movement of capital and payments.
applies only between the

C provides

37. Article 73

national or

States with respect to the relevant provisions

that the restrictions

community law adopted

in respect

which

exist

on 31 December 1993 under

of the movement of capital to or from third

countries involving investment (including investment in real estate), establishment, the

provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets can be

maintained.

The Council may,

from the
required for those measures

acting by a qualified majority on a proposal

Commission, adopt measures in these areas. Unanimity is
which constitute a step back in Community law in regards
movement of capital to or from third countries.
Article 73

from

F

states that

where

in exceptional circumstances

to liberalization

movements of

of the

capital to or

third countries (threaten to) cause serious difficulties for the operation of

EMU,

the

Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the

ECB, may

take safeguard measures with regard to third countries for a

period not exceeding six months (provided that such measures are strictly necessary).

On

the basis of Article

228a and 73g, the Council

proposal of the Commission)
restrict the

allows

may

parallel with the

movement of capital and payments

Member

to or

(acting

common

by a qualified majority on a
foreign and security policy,

from certain countries. Article 73g.2

States to take unilateral measures as long as the Council did not decide

on such measures. The Council may (again acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
of the Commission) decide that the Member State concerned shall amend or abolish such
measures (Article 73g.3).
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38.5^

Article 104.1. Section 2 of this article provides an exception for publicly

credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves

by

be given the same treatment by national central banks and the

ECB

owned

central banks, shall

as private credit

institutions.

39. Article 104a.

1.

40. Article 104b.

1.

41. The term "government" should be interpreted as general government, that

government, regional or local government and social security funds,

is

central

to the exclusion

of

commercial operation, as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic
Accounts (see Article 2 of the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure).

42. Article 109e.4.

During the second

stage, there is

no

43. Article 104c. 2 and Article

1

Member

real prohibition.

excessive government deficits from stage three

(cf.

States are obliged to avoid

Article 104c.

1

and Article 109c. 3).

of the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.

44.Article 104c.3.

45./J.

46.Article 104c. 4 and Article 109c.

47... but only in case the

State exists or

may occur

Commission considers

that

an excessive deficit in a

Member

(Article 104c. 5).

48. Article 104c. 6; the decision will be taken by a qualified majority of the votes.
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49.Article 104c.7.

50.Article 104c.8.

on a recommendation
from the Commission by a majority of two-thirds of the votes weighted in accordance
with article 148J.2 of the EEC-Treaty. The Member State concerned is not allowed to
51. The Council will take the decisions under Article 104c. 7 and 8

vote.

52. Article 104c. 12.

53. Article 109f.l.

54. The President will be appointed by

common

accord of the governments of the

Member

States at the level of Heads of State or Government. Account will be taken of
recommendation from, as the case may be, the Committee of Governors of the
central banks of the Member States or the Council of the EMI. The European Parliament
and the Council will be consulted on the nomination (Article 109f.l). At the Summit in
October 1993, the Belgian Alexandre Lamfalussy has been appointed as the first EMIPresident; he will stay on for a period of three years which started on 1 January 1994.

the

55. Article 109e.5.

56.Article 103a.2.

57. Article 104c.

1.

58. Article 104c. 11.

Fratianni points out that
it is

not clear that penalties, if imposed, can be enforced.

The Council of Ministers

will find

it

hard in any case to

61

difficulty,

imposed on governments that are in financial
and the Accord does not give the Council the

authority

to

collect fines

suspension

covered

resort

to

"natural"

of regional

by the

and

Common

penalties,

structural

such as

funds

or

Policy

Agricultural

the

funds

(CAP).

Furthermore, European politicians will dislike the prospect

of governments having to

consequences

the

of

tell their

citizens they

austerity

programs

must suffer
to

satisfy

bureaucrats in Brussels.

See Fratianni et

al.,

Princeton University, The Maastricht

Way

to

EMU

40

(1992).

59. Id.

60. Article 104c. 12.

The

decision to impose sanctions and the decision to abrogate them has to be taken on

a recommendation from the Commission by a majority of two-thirds of the votes

weighted

in

accordance with

article 148.2.

The Member

State concerned is not allowed

to participate in the voting (cf. Article 104c. 13).

61. Actually, the

European Central Bank (or "Euro fed" as

it

was

originally called),

was

scheduled to be set up at the beginning of the second stage. However, in September
1991, the [ECO/FIN] Council, meeting in Apeldoorn (The Netherlands) decided to

postpone

its

creation until stage three. Instead, a transitional institution

would be

set up:

the European Monetary Institute. The advantage of this is that the ECB "will not be
burdened with public memories of the political or economic quagmires that may be
encountered during the transition phase." See Fratianni et al., Princeton

University, supra note 58,

at 16-17.

62. Article 4a. Actually, the establishment occurs already before the third stage. Article

1091 provides that immediately after the decision on the date for the beginning of the
third stage has

been taken

in

accordance with Article 109J.3 (or immediately after 1 July
Member States will appoint the President, the Vice-

1988), the governments of the

President and the other

Executive Board
prepare for the

is

full

Board of the ECB. As soon as the
and the ECB shall be established and shall
powers which will start on the first day of the third

members of

appointed, the
exercise of their

stage (see Article 1091.1).

the Executive

ESCB
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63. Article 106.1.

64. Article 106.2.

65. The term "System" should be understood only to describe the existence of the

ECB

governed by a common set of rules and
committed to the objectives and tasks assigned to it. See Chrystopher A. Whytock, supra
note 5, at 482 n. 110.
and the

NCBs

as integral parts of the system,

66. Article 3b and Article 12.1. of the Protocol

on the Statute of the European System of

Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

67. It should be noted at this point that as soon as the
the tasks of the

EMI, which

will

68.... and the dissolution of the

go

ECB

Monetary Committee

69. Article 1091.4 stresses that this

is

established,

it

will take over

into liquidation (Article 1091.2).

measure

will not

(cf.

Article 109c. 2).

modify the external value of the

ECU.

70.Article 1091.4.
It is

possible that the national currencies and the

while.
in the

ECU

will circulate side

by side for a

The problems that this may generate are discussed in Continuity and innovation
transition from the old ECU to the new ECU, ECU Newsletter, March 1992,

16.

71. Article 105a.2 provides that "[t]he council may, acting in accordance with the
to in Article 189c and after consulting the ECB, adopt measures to
harmonize the denominations and technical specifications of all coins intended for

procedure referred
circulation

to

the

Community."

72. Article 109c.2.

extent necessary

to

permit their smooth circulation within the
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73. Article 109c, in fine.

74. Article 109c.

1.

75. Article 109f.

76. The "Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois"

bank in
European Monetary
Institute and Article 1.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank). The IML used to be only an observer in the
Committee of Presidents of the Central Banks.
the Treaty

(cf.

is

attributed the status of central

Article 1.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the

77. Article 109f.l.

78. The appointment will follow a recommendation from, as the case

may

be,

the

Committee of Governors of the central banks of the Member States or the Council of the
EMI, and after consulting the European Parliament and the Council. The President will
be a person of recognized standing and professional experience in monetary or banking
matters and has to be an EC-national (Article 109f.

1).

He

is

appointed for a period of

on the Statute of the European Monetary
Alexandre Lamfalussy was appointed as the first President

three years (Article 9.3. of the Protocol
Institute). In

October

of the EMI.

He

79. The

last year,

took up his functions on

1

January 1994.

European Monetary Cooperation Fund was

[1973 O.J. (L 89)

80. Article 109f.l

81. Article

Monetary

82. Article

Monetary

set

up by Council Regulation 907/73

2].

and 109f.2.

109f.2 and Article 4.1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European
Institute.

109f.3 and Article 4.2. of the Protocol on the Statute of the European
Institute.
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83. Article

Monetary

109f.3 and Article 4.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European
Institute.

84. Article 109f.4, Article 109f.5, Article 109f.6 and Article 6.4 of the Protocol
Statute of the

European Monetary

on the

Institute.

85. This provision aims to ensure "that transactions with these reserves shall not interfere

with the monetary policy and exchange-rate policy of the competent monetary authority

of any

Member

State and shall be consistent with the objectives of the

proper functioning of the exchange-rate mechanism of the

EMS."

EMI

and the

{see Article 6.4 of the

Protocol on the Statute of the European Monetary Institute).

86. Article 6.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the

European Monetary

Institute.

87.Article 109a.2(a).

88. Article 109a.2(b); the initial appointment of the

members of

the Executive

Board

is

organized in Article 50 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central

Banks and of the European Central Bank.

on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
89. Article 12.1 of the Protocol

90. Article 109a.

1.

91. Article 12.1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.

92. Article 12.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central

Banks

and of the European Central Bank.

93. Articles 10.2 and 10.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of

Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
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94. Article 53 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks

and of the European Central Bank makes clear
as there are

Member

that

it

will only

remain

to exist as long

States with a derogation (see infra).

95. Article 45.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks

and of the European Central Bank.

96. Cf. Article 45.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the

European System of Central

Banks and of the European Central Bank.

97. Article 108a.

1.

98. Article 108a. 2.

99. Article 108a.3.

lOO.Article 109.

101. Article 105.4, first indent.

102. Article 105.4, second indent.

103. Article 105.5.

104. See Article 105.6 and Article 25.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

105. See Article 5.1 and 5.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of

Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

106.Article 5.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
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107. See Articles 28 and 29 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of

Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

108. Article 30 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks

and of the European Central Bank.

109. Article 106.1.

110. Article 106.3.

111. Article 3.1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks

and of the European Central Bank.

12. The

[ECO/FIN] Council formulates the general orientations for exchange-rate policy
The Council will act by a qualified majority either on a recommendation
from the Commission and after consulting the ECB or on a recommendation from the
ECB. The Council may also unanimously decide, on a recommendation from the ECB
or from the Commission (after consulting the ECB) and after consulting the European
1

(Article 109.2).

Parliament, to conclude formal agreements on an exchange-rate system for the

ECU

in

non-Community currencies (Article 109.1). The [ECO/FIN] Council may,
on a recommendation from the ECB or from the
Commission (after consulting the ECB) adopt, adjust or abandon the central rates of the
ECU within the exchange-rate system. The European Parliament will be informed about
relation to

acting by a qualified majority,

any such decision (Article 109.1). All Council decisions in this field have
prejudice to the primary objective of the maintaining of price stability.

to

be without

113. Article 22 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank states that "[t]he ECB and national central banks may
provide facilities, and the ECB may make the regulations, to ensure efficient and sound
clearing and

payment systems within

the

Community and with

other countries."

114. QT. Article 3b.

11 5. Alberto Alesina
politics in

& Vittorio Grilli,

The European Central Bank: reshaping monetary

Europe, in Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe

from THE US

49, 55 (Matthew B. Canzoneri et

al.

eds., 1992).

and Lessons
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bank

11 6. Traditionally, an independent central
inflation. See, e,g,

Michele Fratianni et

al.,

is

seen as the best guarantee for a low

Princeton University, supra note

58,

at 28. A classic counter example is the Japanese central bank; the Japanese inflation rate
is rather low while its central bank is not so independent (at least not formally). Cf.
Thomas F. Cargill, Central Bank Independence and Regulatory
Responsibilities: The Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve 3 (1989).

111. See also Article 7 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central

Banks and of the European Central Bank.
Fratianni points out that is might be difficult "[to] discern between information gathering
and consultation with national authorities, the Council of Ministers and the European
Commission - as mandated in Articles 108 and 109 of the Accord - and actions that
reflect seeking

supra note 58,

and taking instructions. "( See Fratianni et al., Princeton University,
at 34).

27 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
118. Article

119. Article 108a and Article 34 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System

of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

120.FRATIANNI et al., Princeton University, supra note 58,

at 37.

121. Article 109a.2.(b) and Article 11.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European

System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. Kenen (supra note., at 30)
members of the Executive Board cannot be reappointed, they will have
no incentive to please politicians - not those of Member States or those of the

points out that as

Community. However he admits
to please politicians precisely

that other authors think that

Board members may

try

because their terms are not renewable and, thus, they will

need new jobs after 8 years on the Board

{Id. at

30 n.28).

122. Note that Article 14.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the

Central Banks and of the European Central

Bank

European System of

prescribes that "the term of office of

a Governor of a national central bank shall not be less that five years."

123. Article 11.4 and 14.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of

Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
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124. Id.

125. Article 109b.

1.

126.1d.

127.Article 109b.2.

128. Article 109b. 3; Article 15 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of

Central Banks and of the European Central

made

Bank provides

that the

annual report will be

available to interested parties free of charge.

129. Article 109b. 3, in fine.

130. Article 15.

1

of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks

and of the European Central Bank.

131. Article 15.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.

132. Article 15.4 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks

and of the European Central Bank.

133.Alesina

&

Grilli,

supra note 115,

at 56.

134.74.

135. Article 104 and Article 21.1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the

of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.

European System
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136.Article 109c.2.

137.74.

138. Article 109c.2, in fine.

139. Article 109e.l.

140. Article 109e.2.(b).

141. Article 109J.1.

142. These criteria are listed in Article 109j of the Treaty and explained in a separate

protocol.

The (non)sense of

Maastrichtse

the criteria

is

discussed by

E.S.B.,

Begrotingscriteria,

W.H.

527-529;

1992,

Geloofwaardigheid en reputatie in de overgangsfase

naar de

Buster,

see

De

also

Zin van de

J.J.

EMU, Bank.

Sijben,

Fin., 1992,

211-217.

143. Article 109J.1, first indent and article 1 of the Protocol on the Convergence Criteria
referred to in Article 109j of the Treaty establishing the European Community
[hereinafter Protocol
rate of inflation,

on the Convergence

The Protocol

states that the

observed over a period of one year before the examination

exceed by more than 1.5% that
terms of price

Criteria].

of, at

most, the three best performing

Member

average

may

not

States in

stability.

144. See Article 109 .j.l, second indent and Article 2 of the Protocol on the

Convergence

Criteria. It

can be derived from these articles that the ratio of the planned or actual

government

deficit to gross

domestic product

the reference value is only exceptional

reference value.
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% An
.

The

exception

ratio

may

not exceed 3

and temporary and the

%

unless the excess over

ratio

remains close to the

of government debt to gross domestic product

may be made

approaching the reference value

in

both cases

if the ratio is sufficiently

may

not exceed

diminishing and

at a satisfactory pace.

145. Article 109J.1, third indent and Article 3 of the Protocol on the Convergence
Criteria.
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146. Article 109J.1, fourth indent and Article 4 of the Protocol on the Convergence
Criteria. The interest-rate criterion is to be respected over a period of one year before
the examination.

147.Article 109J.1, in fine.

148. Article 109J.2.

The

149. See Article 109J.3.

decisions will be taken by a qualified majority.

150.There are only two ways to keep stage three from starting
deciding before 1998 to
possibility is to

have arisen

151. Article

amend

start this stage

on a date

the Treaty (which

in the ratification

is

later than 1

in 1999: the first is

by

January 1999; the other

very unlikely in light of the difficulties that

of the original

text).

109J.4; see also the Protocol on the Transition to the Third Stage of

Economic and Monetary Union.

152. See Article 109k.

1.

15 3. This arrangement can be analyzed as follows:

On

the one hand, this significantly reduces the prospect that

high-inflation, high-public-debt countries will be admitted

community of countries with sound
Thus, low-inflation countries may go ahead

into a low-inflation

public finances.

with

EMU

a free ride.

an

EMU

without having high-inflation countries join for

On

the other hand, discarding the principle of

that automatically includes all

EC members

has

reduced Southern Europe's power to bargain for additional
compensation and has diminished the relevance of the
Social Charter.

See Fratianni et al., Princeton University, supra note 58,

at 9.

154. The Council will decide according to the procedure laid out in Article 109k.

109k.2.

155. See Article 109k.3.

1

and

9
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156. Article 43.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European

System of Central Banks

and of the European Central Bank.

157. See Article 109k.5.

15$. See Article 43 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank.

159. Article 48 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks

and of the European Central Bank.

160. Articles 45 and 53 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank.

161. Article 45.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the

European System of Central Banks

and of the European Central Bank.

162. Cf. Article 45.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank.

163. Cf. Article 109j (the convergence criteria remain applicable to these countries) and
Article

109m.

164. Article 109k.3 implies that Article 104c.

1

will take full effect while Article 104c.

and 104c. 11 are not yet applicable.

165. Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United

Kingdom of Great

Britain and

Northern Ireland.

166. Cf. G. Brouhns,

La conference intergouvernementale sur

monetaire, Doc. Fin., May/June 1992, 32.

167. Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to

Denmark.

I'union economique et
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\6S.See William A. Lovett, Banking and Financial Institutions
The explanation given by the author is that
[t]ools

Law

33 (1992).

and capital goods imported from the mother country

absorbed a heavy deficit in payments from the colonies
with substantial net credits from English merchants and

And

bankers.
Indies

while the balance of payments with the West

was favorable, leading to a steady inflow of Spanish
were sent back to England. This

dollars, the better coins
left

a scarce supply of specie in the colonies, featuring a

considerable residue of

169. The independence

were

was declared

worn and clipped

in July 1776.

By

dollars.

1777, the Articles of Confederation

drafted; they were, however, not finally ratified until 1781. In

Constitution of the

new

nation

was signed and submitted

September 1787, the

to Congress;

it

became

effective

in July 1788.

170.LOVETT, supra note 168,

at 34.

Const, art. I, s. 8 confers the power
and of foreign Coin" upon Congress.

171. U.S.
thereof,

172. Acts to Charter the
1

Stat. 191, 196. It

As soon

Bank of the United

"[t]o coin

States, Feb.

Money,

25 and Mar.

regulate the Value

2, 1791, chs.

should be noted, however, that this Bank was not the

as 1781, the

Bank of North America had been chartered by

first

the United States

Congress under the Articles of Confederation.

Cf. Carl Felsenfeld, The
38 Vill. L. Rev. 2, 8 (1993).

Company

Act:

173. Jeff

Madura, Financial Markets and Institutions 356

Has

it

lived

its life

?,

X-XI,

U.S. bank.

Bank Holding

(1992).

17 4. See Lovett, supra note 168, at 9.

175.LOVETT, supra note 168,

at 35.

176.Act to Charter the Second Bank of the United States, Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3
266.

Stat.

73

177.Thibaut de Saint Phalle, The Federal Reserve an Intentional Mystery 44
(1985).

178. The

bank was reorganized as a Pennsylvania

state

bank, but failed in the subsequent

depression.

179. The Act currently characterized as the National
called the National Currency

668). In 1874, the

343,

s.

1,

Act

(cf.

name changed

to

Bank Act of 1863, was

Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58,

s.

originally

11, 12 Stat. 665,

National Bank Act (see Act of June 20, 1874, ch.

18 Stat. 123).

However, Lovett notes that "it
assistance from larger city banks, and
nation in New York City." (see Lovett,

180. This Act did, of course, not create a "central bank."

did

strengthen banking reserves,

facilitate

encourage a stronger banking center for the
supra note 168,

at 43).

Aman

Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and
Limits of Conditions by the Federal Reserve Board, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 837, 841 n.16
IZl.See Alfred C.

Jr.,

(1989).

182. Madura, supra note 173, at 356.

183.Act of

ISA.See

May

30, 1908, ch. 229, 35 Stat. 546.

Lawrence

System 21

185.Act of

E.

Clark, Central Banking under the Federal Reserve

(1935).

May

30, 1908, ch. 229.,

s.

17,

35

Stat.

552.

186. Clark, supra note 184, at 22.

187. Report of the National
Sess. (Jan. 8, 1912).

Monetary Commission,

S.

Doc. No. 243, 62d Cong., 2d

74
188. The plan provided for a central
States"), with a

country.

head office

in

bank ("National Reserve Association of the United

Washington, D.C., and

The Association would be chartered for
stock in the new

national banks could purchase

fifteen

branches throughout the

fifty years.

institution.

Both

state

banks and

The National Reserve

Association would be controlled by the banks, their voting rights being dependent upon
their share in the capital stock.

189. Clark, supra note 184, at 28.

190. This bill differed

from the Aldrich

bill is

several particulars; see

Clark, supra note

184, at 29-32.

\9\.See Clark, supra note 184,

at 27.

192. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (current version at 12

U.S.C

ss.

221-522

(1988)).

193.Actof Dec. 23, 1913,

194. tee

ch. 6,

Lovett, supra note 168,

s.

1,

38

Stat. 251.

at 47.

195. President Truman forced the Treasury on 4 March 1951 to recognize that the
monetary policy would be set by the Federal Reserve System and that the debt would not
be monetized by the Fed. According to DE Saint Phalle (supra note 177, at 75), the
agreement was largely a promise by the Fed of cooperation with the Treasury, rather

than a declaration of independence.

196. It should be noted that the System does not act very much in the manner anticipated
by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 {See de Saint Phalle, supra note 177, at 56).

197.The Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, s. 203(b), 49 Stat. 704 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
241 (1988)) excluded the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the
Currency from membership on the Board (originally, they were members ex officio).
s.

75
198. The President

may

not select more than one person from any Federal Reserve

and should choose persons with backgrounds
and commerce. See 12 U.S.C. s. 241 (1988).
District,

199.12 U.S.C.

s.

242 (1988).

200.12 U.S.C.

s.

241 (1988).

201.12 U.S.C.

s.

242 (1988).

in agriculture, finance, industry

202.1d.

203.1d.

204. It should be noted that the Board of Governors also has responsibilities in the area

of the nation's payments mechanism and for federal consumer credit regulations. These

framework of this thesis. Cf. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Federal Reserve System
Purposes & Functions 4 (1984).
aspects are, however, less important within the

205. William C.

206. Actually

it

Melton, Inside the Fed 4

(1985).

buying and selling of securities was

lasted until the 1920s until the

"discovered" as an effective tool of monetary policy.

Cf.

Carl H. Moore, The
(1990). Moore notes

Federal Reserve System a History of the First 75 Years 65

that the "[TJounding fathers of the Federal Reserve System envisioned the discounting of
commercial paper by member banks as the heart and soul of the system." (Id. at 126).

207.12 U.S.C.

s.

461(b)(2)(A) (1988).

Since 1980, the reserve requirement
they

are

members of

the

is

applied to

Reserve

Federal

all

commercial banks, whether or not

System.

See

Depository

Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221,
132, 133-138; codified at 12 U.S.C.

The Board of Governors admits

s.

s.

Institutions

103, 4 Stat.

461(b) (1988).

that adjustments to the reserve

suited to the day-to-day implementation of

requirements are not well

monetary policy, an important reason being

76
that

"[they] are an important variable in banks' business calculations,

changes

in

them would unnecessarily complicate

Cf Board of Governors,

supra note 204,

financial planning

by these

and frequent
institutions."

at 70.

208.12 U.S. C. s. 357 (1988).
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Act of 1980 provides that
nonmember institutions having deposits reservable under the Act would have access to
discount window on the same basis as member institutions. Cf. Board of
Governors, supra note 204, at 57. The Board of Governors notes that
the

[t]he Federal

Reserve Act originally envisioned that the

discount rate of each Reserve

Bank would be

the banking and credit conditions in

years,

its

set to reflect

District.

Over

the

however, the progressive integration of regional

credit markets into a fluid national

produced

a

national

determination.

As a

perspective

result, the

market has gradually
for

discount

twelve Reserve Banks

rate

now

post a uniform structure of discount rates except during the
short periods when some Reserve Banks already have
changed their rate, but the boards of other Reserve Banks
have not yet met to take such action.
Id. at 63.

209.12 U.S. C.

s.

301 (1988).

210.15 U.S.C.

s.

78g (1988).

211. Mark F. Bernstein,

The Federal Open Market Committee and the sharing of
Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 Va. L. Rev. Ill, 118 (1989).

212.12 U.S.C.

s.

248

213.12 U.S.C.

s.

248 (a)(l)(1988).

s.

357(1988).

(j)

(1988).

214.A*.

215.12 U.S.C.

77
216.12 U.S. C.

s.

248-1 (1988).

217.12 U.S. C.

s.

248

(b) (1988).

218.12 U.S. C.

s.

248

(f)

219.12 U.S. C.

s.

248(g) (1988).

220.12 U.S.C.

s.

248

221.12 U.S. C.

s.

348a (1988).

(1988).

(h) (1988).

222. The most important are the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration
the National Credit

(NCUA) and

Union Insurance Fund (NCUSIF).

223. See the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (codified as

amended

at

Institutions

12 U.S.C. ss. 1811-1834 (b) (1988)), as further amended by the Financial
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No.

101-73, 103 Stat. 183 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act

of 1991 (FDICIA). The

FDICIA was

enacted as part of the Comprehensive Deposit

Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat.

2236. Section 307 of the
the

FDIC

to

cover

latter

al insured

to thrift institutions).

Act has expanded the back-up enforcement authority of

depository institutions (previously,

See 12 U.S.C.

s.

it

was only applicable

1818(t) (1988).

The Expansion of State Bank Powers, The Federal
Response, And the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 Fordh. L.Rev.
1133, 1160(1990).
224. See Arthur E. Wilmarth

225. See Bank Holding
at 12

U.S.C.

ss.

Jr.,

Company Act of

1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended

1841-1850 (1988)), as further amended by various provisions of the

Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989

L. No.

101-73, 103 Stat. 195.

It

(FIRREA), Pub.

should be noted, however, that Congress did not

preempt all state regulation over bank holding companies. The Bank Holding Company
Act states that the different states will keep "such powers and jurisdiction which it now

78
has or

may

hereafter have with respect to companies, banks,

bank holding companies,

1846 (1988)). The Supreme Court has ruled
(cf.
that this provision permits the states to adopt nondiscriminatory laws with respect to bank
holding companies that are more restrictive than federal law (See, e.g., Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 48-49 (1980).
and subsidiaries thereof

12 U.S.C.

226.12 U.S.C.

s.

348a (1988).

227.12 U.S.C.

s.

243 (1988).

228.12 U.S.C.

ss.

s.

301-302 (1988).

229. See 12 U.S.C.

s.

302 (1988); 12 U.S.C.

the selection.

302 and 305 (1988).

230.12 U.S.C.

ss.

231.12 U.S.C.

s.

308 (1988).

232.12 U.S.C.

s.

248(f)(1988).

233.12 U.S.C.

s.

341 (1988).

234.12 U.S.C.

s.

341 (1988).

235.See 12 U.S.C.

s.

521 (1988).

s.

304

(1988) describes the procedure for

79
236.12 U.S.C.

ss.

301 and 357 (1988).

231. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.

s.

325 (1988).

238. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 requires

Reserve Banks charge for the cost hereof, and that all depository
must have access to these services (see 12 U.S.C. s. 248a (1988)).

that the

239.12 U.S.C.

An amount
Governors.

282 (1988).

s.

equal to
It

3%

is

paid

in,

while the balance

however, not very likely

is,

because the District Banks have

little

240. Melton, supra note 205,

at 8

is

subject to call

by the Board of
be demanded

that the balance will ever

need of money.

Beckhart, Federal Reserve System 45

Cf.

Benjamin Haggott

(1972).

explains that

the commercial banks that stood to benefit
from the ability of the Federal Reserve Banks to
make advances should reasonably be expected to bear the

[m]any

felt that

directly

cost

of

providing

for

their

establishment

subscribing equity capital. At the

same

through

time, there

was

strong sentiment in banking circles that the Federal Reserve

Banks should be largely under the control of the banking
community, and not the federal government. Private
ownership seemed to meet that objective.

24l.See 12 U.S.C.

s.

283 (1988).

285 (1988).

242.12 U.S.C.

s.

243. Board of

Governors, supra note 204,

244.1d.

institutions

at 9.

80

245.12 U.S. C.

s.

289 (1988).

246.12 U.S. C.

s.

222 (1988).

321 (1988). The Board will consider "the financial condition of the
applying bank, the general character of its management, and whether or not the corporate
247. See 12 U.S.C.

s.

powers exercised are consistent with the purpose of [the Federal Reserve Act]" (12
U.S.C. s. 322 (1988)). The Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat.
132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) gave nonmember banks access to some
of the same services as member banks. They are also subject to the same reserve
requirements. See s. 103(b), 94 Stat. 132, 133-135.

248.12 U.S.C.

s.

333 (1988).

249.12 U.S.C.

s.

287(1988).

250.12 U.S.C.

s.

289 (1988).

251. Ralph Jay
Wexler, Federal Control over the
*

Money Market, 27 Ariz.

St. L.

J.

159,

178 (1981).

252. The Governors Committee was set up in response to concerns by the Secretary of

Treasury that the uncoordinated purchases of the Reserve Banks were adversely affecting
the market for government securities. See Bernstein, supra note 211, at 119 n.34.

253.1d.

254. See Barry Eichengreen, Designing a central bank for Europe: a cautionary tale from
the early years

of the Federal Reserve System,
Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S.
eds., 1992).

Establishing a Central Bank:
13, 17 (Matthew B. Canzoneri et al.

in

81

255. The Federal Reserve Board was the forerunner of the Board of Governors. See

Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614,

s.

203, 49

Stat.

704.

March 1923 added a fifth member to
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The newly
formed Open Market Investment Committee came - according to the resolution - under
the general supervision of the Federal Reserve Board.
256. The resolution approved by the Board on 22
the Committee, to be appointed

See Eichengreen, supra note 254,

at 18.

257.Eichengreen, supra note 254,

at 19.

258,/rf.

259. Eichengreen, supra note 254, at 20.

260.Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,
s. 263 (1988)).

s.

8,

48

Stat.

168 (codified as amended

at

12 U.S.C.

2 61. Eichengreen, supra note 254, at 20.

262. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614,

U.S.C.

s.

s.

205, 49

Stat.

648 (codified as amended

at 12

263 (1988)).

263.12 U.S.C. s. 263 (1988). One of the representatives is elected by the board of
directors of the Reserve Bank of New York; one by the boards of the Reserve Banks of
Boston, Philadelphia and Richmond; one by the boards of the Reserve Banks of
Cleveland and Chicago; one by the boards of the Reserve Banks of Atlanta, Dallas and
St. Louis; and one by the boards of the Reserve Banks of Minneapolis, Kansas City, and
San Francisco.

82
264. It should be noted that there
the removal of a Reserve

Bank

The Board of Governors

is

is

no provision

in the Federal

Reserve Act

that

makes

representative possible (Bernstein, supra note.., at 143).

allowed to remove Reserve Bank officers for cause (see 12

U.S.C. s. 248 (f) (1988)). This provision, however, was not intended to grant the Board
removal power over the Reserve Bank representatives on the FOMC (Id. at 144 n.163).

265. Board of

Governors, supra note 204,

at 7.

266. Bernstein, supra note 211, at 139.

267.Madura, supra note

173, at 359.

268.12 U.S.C. ss. 353-359 (1988) define the various assets that the Federal Reserve can
trade in the open market. Most operations, however, are carried out in the market for
United States government securities because
the central

bank must be able both

timely basis, at

may be needed

its

to

own

to

on a
whatever volume

buy and

convenience, in

keep the supply of reserves

sell

in line with

prevailing policy objectives. These conditions require that
the instrument
active

buys or
that can

it

market

sells

be traded

accommodate

in a broad, highly

the

transactions

without distortions or disruptions to the market

market for U.S.

government

securities

satisfies

conditions, and the Federal Reserve carries out
greatest part of

its

See Bernstein, supra note 211,

open market operations

itself.

by

in that

The

these
far the

market.

at 115.

269. Bernstein, supra note 211, at 117 n.2L

270.FOMC

443 U.S. 340, 346-349 (1979). The Supreme Court decided that
the information contained in the directives is exempted from the Freedom of Information
Act (Id. at 354-360; see 5 U.S.C. s. 552(b) (5) (1988).
v. Merill,

271.12 U.S.C.

s.

263

(b) (1988).

83

lll.Supra note 211,

111-112.

at

273. The structure of the
private bankers

FOMC. The
banking

FOMC

and practically necessary

politically

is

has been defended on the basis that the participation of
to the effective operation

of the

Reserve Bank representatives have denied that they are captives of private
furthermore the

interests;

FOMC

has insisted that they strictly separate their

on the FOMC from their work in the Reserve Banks, that they not take
instructions from their boards of directors and that they not divulge the FOMC's secret
duties

actions {Id. at 136-137).

llA.See, e.g., Melcher v. Federal

Open Mkt. Comm., 644

ajfdon other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C.

510 (D.D.C. 1986),
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034

F. Supp.

Cir. 1987), cert,

(1988).

275.Wexler, supra note 251,

276.See 12 U.S.C.

277.15 U.S.C.

s.

ss.

at 176.

261-262 (1988).

1691b

(b)

(1988) and 12 C.F.R.

s.

267 (1993).

278. The Thrift Institutions Advisory Council has no statutory basis.

Governors established

this

panel in 1980

when

the

The Board of
Monetary Control Act was enacted.

Cf. Paul A. Volcker, Statement before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy
of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House ofRepresentatives,

5 June 1986, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 534, 539 (1986).

279. Cf.

Aman, supra

280.12 U.S.C.

s.

note 181, at 850.

241 (1988).

281. Normally, the President can appoint only two governors during a four-year term; in
practice,

however, resignations occur frequently. See Colin D.

Money, Banking, and Monetary Policy 264

(1988).

Campbell et

al.,

84

282.Aman {supra note 181,
might be more vulnerable to

at

presidential pressure.

283.12 U.S. C.

s.

242 (1988).

284.12 U.S. C.

s.

243 (1988).

285.Aman, supra note 181,

286.12 U.S. C.

s.

2%l.See 5 U.S.C.

288.5 U.S.C.

at 850.

250(1988).

ss.

551-559 and 701-706 (1988).

552b (1988).

s.

289.12 U.S.C.

s.

225a (1988).

290.12 U.S.C.

s.

247(1988).

291.12 U.S.C.

s.

248 (1988).

292.Aman, supra note 181,

293. Board of

850 n.53) suggests

at

850

n. 57.

Governors, supra note 204,

at 2-4.

that, for this reason,

the

Chairman

85
294. Board of

Governors, supra note 204, at 2.
Actually, this analysis has been made as early as 1952 by Allan Sprowl, president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Sprowl brought this view to the hearings of a "Joint
Economic Committee" that tried to determine the meaning of independence for the
Federal Reserve System. (Cf.

Moore, supra

295. See supra note 134, and accompanying

296. Cf. Cargill, supra note 116,

note 206, at 112-113).

text.

at 38.

297. Supra note 116, at 40.

298. See, e.g.
13

,

Charles Goodhart,

(Andy Mullineux

A

European Central Bank,

in

European Banking

299. Cf.

Kenen, Group of Thirty, supra note

300. See

de Saint Phalle, supra note

301. Cargill, supra note 116, at 19.

5, at 31 n.33.

177, at 77.

The government

deficit represents

an important

channel through which a less independent central bank contributes to inflation.

302. Supra note 116, at 5.

303. The data are borrowed from Alesina

&

Grilli,

304. See supra notes 296-297, and accompanying

306.1d. at 46.

Governors, supra note 204,

supra note 115,

text.

305. Cargill, supra note 116, at 42.

307. Board of

12,

ed., 1992).

at 87.

at

71-73.

86
30$. See, e.g. David Folkerts-Landau & Peter M. Garber, The ECB: a bank or a
monetary policy rule ?, in Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and
Lessons from the U.S. 86, 102 (Matthew B. Canzoneri et al. eds., 1992).
,

Golembe, Federal Banking Agency Reform: The Central Bank
Connection, 12 No. 24 Banking Pol'Y Rep. 4 (1993).

309. See Carter H.

310. Supra note 116, at 61.

311.Cargill, supra note 116,

at 62.

312. Supra note 116, at 63.

3 13. Article 25.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank states: "In accordance with any decision of the Council
under Article 105(6) of this Treaty, the ECB may perform specific tasks concerning
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions
institutions with the exception

of insurance undertakings."

314. David Folkerts-Landau and Peter

M. Garber

note that "[a]s long as the

not intend to supply liquidity as a lender of last resort to stabilize

markets,

it

will not

and other financial

be necessary

to restrict the

amount of

ECB

Community

credit risk

it

does

financial

might assume

under such operations through supervisory and regulatory policies." See Folkerts-Landau
& Garber, supra note 308, at 102.

315.Cargill, supra note 116,

at 65.

3 16. Eugene N. White, discussion on Barry Eichengreen, Designing a central

bank for

Europe: a cautionary tale from the early years of the Federal Reserve System,
Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S.

46 (Matthew B. Canzoneri

in

13,

et al. eds., 1992).

3 17. Campbell

et al., supra note 281,

at

263. See also Moore, supra note 206, at 7.

3 18. Campbell

et al., supra note 281,

at

263.

"

87
319. See Wexler, supra note 251, at 183.

The

regional banks continue to play a role in

the monetary policy-making through their representatives

in

the

FOMC;

they also

administer the discount window.

320.Eichengreen, supra note 254,

The author

at 14.

points out that "decentralization

created problems not anticipated by the framers of the Federal Reserve Act.

321. Article 35.6 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank states, in part: "The Court of Justice shall have

by a national central bank of obligations
this provision can be used to fight
between the ECB and the different national central

jurisdiction in disputes concerning the fulfillment

under

this Statute." It is,

however, unclear whether

the allocation of responsibilities

banks.

322. Supra note 254, at 14.

323. Id. at 33-34.
the plans for a

Maastricht

is

The German Bundesbank,

for example, has never

Monetary Union. Within German conservative

been very happy with

circles,

the Treaty of

Cf. C. Van Lotringen, De
Central Bank already exists),

described as "Versailles without a war."

Europese centrale bank bestaat al (The European
Intermedial, No. 46, 10 November 1992, 13.

324.Eichengreen, supra note 254, at 14.

325.Davtd M. Jones, The Politics of Money: The

FED Under Alan Greenspan

184 (1991).

326.74. at 183.

327.Eichengreen, supra note 254,

328. See,

e.g.

,

A.F.P.

at 33.

Bakker,

De

Europese

monetaire

eenwording

in

een

stroomversnelling (The European monetary integration in a rapid), Internationale

Spectator, October 1991, 659-660.

88
329. George Alogoskoufis

& Richard Portes, European Monetary

currencies in a tripolar world, in Establishing

and Lessons from the U.S. 273 (Matthew

Union and international

a Central Bank: Issues

B. Canzoneri et

al.

in

Europe

eds., 1992).

330.1d.

LAW

LIBR/

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

FOR LIBRARY

USE ONLY

